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INTERFACES OF STRATEGIC LEADERS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, 
REVIEW, AND RESEARCH AGENDA 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Interfaces are of growing importance for theorizing and testing the influence of 
strategic leaders on firm behavior and actions. But despite their relevance and ubiquity, the 
lack of a commonly accepted definition and unifying framework has hindered researchers’ 
ability to take stock, synthesize, and systematize extant knowledge. We first develop an 
encompassing definition and organizing framework to review 122 prior studies across three 
decades. We then chart promising directions for future research around three concepts central 
to the framework and review: (a) why do interfaces occur? (b) what happens at these 
interfaces? and (c) what are the impacts of interfaces? Together, the encompassing definition, 
framework, review, and specific directions for future research provide the much needed 
platform to agglutinate research and advance strategic leader interfaces as the next frontier of 
strategic leadership research.  
 
Keywords: strategic leader interfaces; top management teams; managers; executives; 
interdependence; SLIs; strategy process  
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Interfaces are the purposive contact points where the separate worlds of actors 
intersect, and are central to facilitating the transfer of influence, information, and resources. 
As organizations and entities within them become more porous, interfaces represent an 
increasingly important phenomenon for management researchers. They are of special interest 
to scholars of top executives because strategic leadership of organizations is a collective 
endeavor entailing a complex web of relationships between executives and other parties. For 
example, these interfaces include the CEO and the top management team (Georgakakis, 
Heyden & Ruigrok, 2015; Klimoski & Koles, 2001; Ling, Simsek, Lubatkin & Veiga, 2008), 
CEO and board of directors (Boyd, Haynes, & Zona, 2011), and the board of directors and 
top management team (Kim, Burns & Prescott, 2009). They also include internal/external 
stakeholders such as middle-managers, customers, investor analysts, and alliance partners.  
Even as the major thrust of recent theorizing and testing on strategic leaders has been 
on “who they are” and “what they do” (Hambrick, 1989), the importance of interfaces, or 
“how they do it” has long been recognized in management research and practice. In the 
Functions of the Executive, Barnard (1938: 215-216) discussed how one of the key functions 
of the executive is to serve as channels of communication or “centers or points of 
interconnection.” At least four of the ten managerial roles identified by Mintzberg (1973) – 
liaison, disseminator, disturbance handler, and negotiator – center upon interfaces with 
internal or external stakeholders. We also know, from everyday experience and our own 
conversations with strategic leaders, that interfaces are the primary means by which the daily 
work of strategic leaders is carried out. Consider the case of a new procurement executive 
launching a new cost cutting initiative who requests that all contracts above a certain 
threshold be sent to him for review.  His decision to make this request by email, rather than 
build rapport and trust with divisional management, resulted in him receiving no contracts 
despite promises and commitments to the contrary.1 Or consider the case of Paul Austin, who 
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was the CEO of Coca Cola from 1966 to 1980.  His dis-agreeableness, emotional instability, 
and confrontational style of engagement created a series of dysfunctional interfaces between 
him and his top management team, and further down the chain of command (Peterson, Smith, 
Martorana & Owens, 2003). The resulting culture of intimidation and conformity to 
procedures inhibited the ability of Coca Cola to adapt to environmental changes, eventually 
leading to disastrous financial performance (Peterson et al., 2003). In a recent issue of the 
Harvard Business Review, Botelho, Powell, Kincaid and Wang (2017) describe how 
“engaging with impact,” or achieving buy-in with employees and stakeholders can be one of 
the hallmarks of successful CEOs. Using the example of the CEOs of the Children’s Hospital 
of Philadelphia and Takeda Pharmaceuticals, they illustrate how successful CEOs develop an 
astute understanding of stakeholders’ motivations and get people on board by aligning them 
around value creation goals.  
Despite their ubiquity and importance to the work of executives, research on 
interfaces of strategic leaders, however, remains scattered and piecemeal, with no common 
definition, framework, or nomenclature for integrating the core elements and dimensions, as 
well as for synthesizing current understanding. Indeed, while a critical mass of relevant 
studies has been marshalled (122 studies, with 70 published in the last ten years), no unifying 
framework exists and there been no rallying call to study interfaces in a more coordinated and 
accumulative fashion. Researchers in strategy, organizational theory, entrepreneurship, and 
organizational behavior have typically focused on a single interface at a time and from 
different perspectives, without considering the possibility of a core set of variables that 
characterize strategic leader interfaces (SLIs)—such as the environmental, task, and social 
context in which they are embedded, function, and evolve. Said simply, even though several 
“pixels” exist related to the specific elements, types, and levels of SLIs, we cannot yet discern 
the “big picture” themes, identify uncharted territory, and highlight issues worthy of further 
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examination. Thus, an integrative review is timely, necessary, and valuable, for not only 
deducing stylized facts and identifying what is known and unknown, but also for guiding 
future research toward an improved understanding and impactful contributions.  
To that end, we first review existing definitions from multiple disciplines to advance 
an encompassing definition of SLIs that synthesizes core elements. Drawing from the 
definition and population of reviewed articles, we next iteratively develop a unifying 
framework that interrelates the context, contact, and consequences of SLIs. Because the 
framework holistically accommodates these three elements across all salient SLIs, we then 
use it to provide a review, summary, and synthesis of more than three decades of relevant 
research. The review brings into sharper focus the knowns and unknowns in the literature, as 
well as the key ambiguities that have plagued research on SLIs. With the review as our 
launching pad, we finally outline eight directions to extend existing conversations, stimulate 
new conversations, and provide ways for new participants to join the conversation.  
AN ENCOMPASSING DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC LEADER INTERFACES 
Even though interfaces are a central fixture of executive life, and contributions 
germane to specific interfaces exist, organizational researchers have yet to adopt a shared, 
formal definition that captures the domain and boundaries of SLIs. Focusing on the CEO-top 
management team interface, Klimoski and Koles (2001: 219) stressed that it is “critical to 
examine the means by which the CEO leads the TMT and uses it to establish the CEO’s true 
potential impact on overall organizational effectiveness.” Similarly, Zaccaro and Klimoski 
(2002: 6) defined the interface as the various ways that “leadership and team processes 
become intertwined so as to influence collective performance.” To Raes, Heijltjes, Glunk & 
Roe  (2011: 103), interfaces are “a place where the separate worlds of TMTs and [middle 
managers] intersect, characterized by an alternation of episodes of contact during which 
interaction or ‘interface processes’ take place, and periods of no contact.”  Most recently, 
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Bromiley and Rau (2016) reviewed a decade of studies on how social, behavioral, and 
cognitive factors associated with the CEO-TMT interface influences strategic decision 
making. However, they stop short of offering a definition or framework. Beyond these 
contributions, others have considered selected aspects of the interface, such as the processes 
that take place at the interface (e.g., Ling et al., 2008), or the nature of communication that 
defines them (e.g., Cao, Simsek, & Zhang, 2010). In management studies broadly, Wren 
(1967) defined an interface as the “contact point” between organizations which are 
“interdependent and interacting” to work towards common goals. Interfaces have also been 
used to examine inter-organizational relationships (Albers, Wohlgezogen, & Zajac, 2016), 
inter-functional relationships (De Ruyter & Wetzels, 2000; Rau, Moslein, & Neyer, 2016), 
cross-functional exchanges (Ashenbaum and Terpend, 2010), and modular systems (de Blok, 
Meijboom, Luijkx, Schols & Schroeder, 2014). 
We undertook three steps towards an encompassing definition: 1) a Web of Science 
search of management journals to identify prior definitions in management research; 2) 
examination of subject dictionaries/textbooks where the concept of interfaces is often used; 
and 3) a cross-disciplinary article search of the Web of Science across ten disciplines.2 Based 
on these searches, we compiled a representative list of definitions in Table 1. 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
Synthesizing the insights across these disciplinary definitions, we propose a definition 
of SLIs as the interdependent social situations in which the attributes, aspirations and/or 
activities of strategic leaders and/or salient stakeholders come into contact with and 
influence each other. We refer to strategic leaders as those with overall responsibility for 
organizational functioning and performance (Hambrick, 1989). Stakeholders are actors, 
groups of actors, or institutions that “can affect or [are] affected by the achievement of the 
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organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984: 46)—via their power, legitimacy, or urgency in 
relation to the firm’s strategy and performance (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). 
 In defining SLIs in this encompassing manner, it is necessary to make some 
qualifying statements regarding scope conditions and semantic relationships (Suddaby, 
2010).  First, SLIs consider more than one party at a time, and thus the combination of 
different actor characteristics is crucial. This distinguishes interface studies from the larger 
body of strategic leadership that focuses on intra-team processes and dynamics. Essentially, 
SLIs capture direct contact among actors in which their attributes, aspirations, and activities 
influence one another. Therefore, while strategic controls or administrative mechanisms (such 
as compensation) can be a conduit through which influence propagates, interface studies must 
explicitly capture “both sides of the ledger” in terms of the actors involved.  
Second, because interfaces occur within the context of the strategic roles, 
responsibilities, and activities of strategic leaders and stakeholders, they are consequential for 
firm behavior, processes, actions, and/or outcomes. As such, they differ from other non-task 
based, mundane, and routinized forms of contact and interaction that occur among leaders on 
an almost daily basis – for example, routine encounters on the corridor or at the water cooler, 
interactions in a social setting, and so forth. Although instances of contact, unless they are in 
the context of strategic demands, roles, and responsibilities, and have consequences for 
strategic processes, behaviors, or outcomes, they fall outside of the proposed definition.   
Finally, a key aspect of the definition is the requirement of interdependence: “[a] state 
by which entities have mutual reliance, determination, influence, and shared vested interests 
in processes they use to accomplish work [strategic] activities” (Mathieu, Marks & Zaccaro, 
2001: 293). Whether the purpose is to share information, transfer resources, or make 
decisions, interfaces are the conduits by which dispersed actors, groups, and organizations 
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become intertwined and shape collective outcomes. As such, the simple correlation or 
coevolution of one leadership variable on another through processes such as cohort effects 
does not constitute an interface, unless they are a consequence of the focal interaction. 
Similarly, the interfaces of strategic leaders with technologies or processes are not included 
unless they are a means to facilitate interdependent interactions.  
METHOD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW 
With the above definition as the conceptual anchor, we turned to assessing the current 
state of SLI research. To ensure a comprehensive review, we performed a multi-faceted 
search encompassing four steps with additional verification checks (see Figure 1). First, using 
the Web of Science we performed a forward-looking citation search of all the articles citing 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) - the core framework for strategic leadership research over the 
last three decades. We reviewed the title, abstract, and when necessary the main body of these 
articles to identify relevant works – our intent at this stage was simply to exclude papers that 
tangentially cite Hambrick and Mason (1984) but are not related to strategic leadership 
research in any capacity. We located 2,476 articles using this approach. Second, we 
performed a search using a combination of over 500 keywords in the Web of Science (details 
of the specific keyword combinations are available upon request).3 This step uncovered 1,691 
additional candidate articles for review for a total of 4,167 unique articles. 
 --- Insert Figure 1 about here ---  
We then performed the third step of our procedure and analyzed the titles and 
abstracts of all 4,167 articles found in the first two steps to determine whether: a) two or more 
strategic leaders and / or stakeholders were present and engaged in contact, and b) whether 
that contact had the potential to be consequential for firm behavior and/or outcomes.4 We 
classified these papers into those that met both criteria and were retained for further review 
(201 papers) and those that did not (3,966 articles). To achieve this classification, each of the 
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4,167 articles was independently categorized by three authors using a coding guide. After 
initial discussions, enhancements to the coding guide were made, and the remaining articles 
coded. A subset of articles was used to assess inter-rater consistency—overall agreement was 
91%, with a Fleiss’ Kappa of 84.5%, indicating strong absolute agreement (ICC (2, 1) = .85) 
and consistency among the reviewers (ICC (2, 3) = .94).   
Limiting our focus to the 201 articles selected for detailed review, we manually coded 
all articles by extracting key quotes and findings and categorizing the articles using a scheme 
consisting of 25 dimensions (available upon request), many of which are present in our 
conceptual framework. In this final step, our third criterion (the presence of interdependence 
between the parties) was applied.  In total, 80 of the 202 coded articles were subsequently 
excluded because they focused on non-interdependent parties (50 articles); considered 
samples that did not include strategic leaders (8 articles); or for other reasons such as being a 
book review or conference proceeding (22 articles). We also performed a verification check 
that our population was comprehensive by reviewing the reference lists of the articles coded 
for detailed review, locating one additional article for a final population of 122 articles. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND REVIEW RESULTS 
Drawing from the definition and population of reviewed articles, we iteratively 
developed the framework (Figure 2) that holistically interrelates the context, contact, and 
consequences of SLIs. The framework is intended as an organizing heuristic, rather than a 
causal model. In this respect, it can be applied to different loci or units of analysis, whether 
among leaders (inter-SLI), between leaders and internal stakeholders (internal-SLI), or 
between leaders and external stakeholders (external-SLI). As with other strategic leadership 
research, the framework is also primarily concerned with the consequences of SLIs for the 
firm’s strategic choices and performance, rather than as an end in themselves.   
--- Insert Figure 2 about here ---  
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Briefly, the context represents the strategic imperatives and broader social dynamics 
that give rise to SLIs by creating interdependencies, either among strategic leaders or 
between strategic leaders and salient stakeholders. Contact refers to the key feature of our 
definition that SLIs represent interdependent social situations in which the attributes, 
activities, and aspirations of two or more actors intersect. Contact addresses key questions 
such as what is intersected at the interface; what are the manifestations of interfaces; and 
what is the nature of influence at the interface? Finally, consequences refer to both the 
proximal and distal outcomes of SLIs. In the first instance, the frequency, duration, mode, 
and scope of interfaces, together with associated influence mechanisms, exert a proximal 
impact on strategic choices. And ultimately, interfaces will have direct and indirect impacts 
on the distal outcomes such as survival, growth, and overall performance. We next provide a 
discussion and synthesizing summary of all prior studies using each of these three elements. 
Context of SLIs 
What is the nature of interdependence?  Although interdependence seems to be 
central to interface definitions, most of what we know about SLI interdependencies is 
inferred from theoretical arguments and interpretations of research findings rather than tests 
of specific hypotheses.  It is also the case that researchers have (explicitly or implicitly) 
considered situations where parties at the interface predominately exhibit pooled, sequential 
or reciprocal interdependence (Thompson, 1967).  
In terms of the CEO-TMT interface, research most commonly focuses on situations of 
sequential interdependence, such as when the TMT depends upon the CEO as a source of 
information (Cao et al., 2010), goal direction (Foo, Sin, & Yiong, 2006), and/or values 
(Hayibor, Agle, Sears, Sonnenfeld & Ward, 2011).  This sequential interdependence between 
the CEO and TMT arises in part due to the disproportionate influence of the CEO given their 
formal position, power, and status (Carmeli, Schaubroeck, & Tishler, 2011). As the titular 
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head, the CEO plays a unique role in motivating, coaching, and rewarding members of the 
TMT (Simsek, Veiga, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2005), and in delegating responsibilities to TMT 
members (Buyl, Boone, & Hendriks, 2014). The CEO also serves a role as a “disturbance 
handler”, intervening to avoid situations of strategic polarisation. For example, in a case 
study of two Canadian hospitals, Kisfalvi, Sergi, and Langley (2016) observed a “triangular” 
interface pattern, where opposition between two factions was managed by the CEO.  
Some other studies have shown that CEOs may sequentially depend on TMT 
members as a source of information and advice (Arendt, Priem & Ndofor, 2005), particularly 
in making decisions that are novel or expose the firm to high levels of uncertainty (Buyl et 
al., 2014; Carmeli, Tishler, & Edmondson, 2012; Hmieleski & Ensley, 2007). CEOs might 
also depend on their TMT members as a source of psychological counsel and support.  For 
example, Mannor, Wowak, Bartkus and Gomez-Mejia (2016: 1975) found that CEOs appoint 
decision-making teams whom they “perceive as providing a supportive inner circle,” but only 
when facing a loss-making context.   
Our review also revealed that the interface between the CEO and TMT is sometimes 
characterized by reciprocal interdependencies, particularly in situations where CEOs and 
TMT members must operate in unison, such as in dynamic, novel, or uncertain environments. 
Lin and Rababah (2014), for example, developed the concept of CEO-TMT exchange quality 
to represent the average quality of reciprocity and emotional and social exchange between the 
CEO and each of his or her executive peers. Such deep, frequent and reciprocal exchanges 
between the CEO and TMT serve as a conduit by which the natural diversity within teams is 
leveraged and parlayed to improve decision quality (Lin & Rababah, 2014) and ultimately 
firm performance (Buyl, Boone, Hendriks, & Matthyssens, 2011).  More broadly, reciprocal 
interdependencies are observed in situations where the influence of the CEO on the TMT, or 
vice versa, depends upon the receptivity or reaction of the other. As an example of this, 
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Stoker, Grutterink, and Kolk (2012) found that efficacy of the CEO’s transformational 
leadership style was contingent on the extent to which their TMT members seek feedback.  
With respect to the CEO-board interface, while there are clearly situations in which 
the CEO and board operate in “parallel universes” (see Boyd et al., 2011 for a review), the 
more common pattern of interdependence is sequential. The CEO depends upon the board not 
only as a source of decisional authority but also for access to external resources (Sauerwald, 
Lin & Peng, 2016). For example, Chen, Ho, and Hsu (2013) found that CEOs in firms 
competing on innovation rely on the board in acquiring, comprehending, and mastering 
external information and resources. CEOs may also depend, early in their tenure, on the 
leadership development activities of board chairs (Shen, 2003), or as a guide for how much 
emphasis the CEO should place on socio-emotional wealth in the context of family firms 
(Goel, Voordecks, van Gils, & van den Heuvel, 2013). In terms of how CEOs may seek to 
influence board perceptions, Westphal (1998) found that when boards became more 
structurally independent, CEOs were more likely to use persuasion and ingratiation tactics to 
retain more control over compensation policy, while Tuggle and colleagues (2010) find that 
CEO duality results in the board reducing its attention to monitoring. 
There is also growing evidence of reciprocal interdependence of the CEO and board 
of directors. Molinari, Hendryx, and Goodstein (1997), for example, found that effective 
governance depends on the ability of the CEO and board of directors to work effectively 
together.  Westphal (1999) showed that friendship ties between the board and the CEO make 
the CEO more likely to rely upon the board for advice and counsel, but at the same time the 
performance effect of this advice was stronger when the board simultaneously had put in 
place long term incentives or ensured the CEO had higher levels of firm ownership. Wu 
(2008) showed that ties between the board and the CEO influence product innovation 
performance.  Most recently, Cornforth and MacMillan’s (2016) case study indicates the 
Interfaces of Strategic Leaders  13 
 
boundary between board chair and CEO responsibilities is subject to renegotiation as the 
relationship develops, forging a reciprocal relationship between the roles. 
Beyond the immediate interfaces among strategic leaders, strategic leaders and 
stakeholders can also exhibit interdependencies. Internally, studies have shown how top 
managers depend on middle managers as a source of ideas and input to strategy (Ren & Guo, 
2011) and as a source of learning and strategic renewal (Sun & Anderson, 2012). To Raes 
and colleagues (2007; 2011), managing the interface with middle managers is a key aspect of 
strategic leadership because of the “catalytic role” that middle managers play in converting 
strategic intent into operational plans. Some studies have shown that middle manager 
performance is influenced by the combination of CEO and TMT leadership styles, with each 
having both complementary and substitutive effects depending on the configuration (Song, 
Zhang, & Wu, 2014).  Externally, the dependence of CEOs and TMTs on stakeholders for 
resources (Dai, Montabon, & Cantor, 2014) or for knowledge is considered a key basis for 
interfaces (Alexiev, Jansen, Van den Bosch & Volberda, 2010; Heyden et al., 2013).   
What demands and imperatives give rise to interfaces? Interdependencies, and the 
interfaces they give rise to, are ultimately dictated by task and positional demands 
(Hambrick, Finkelstein & Mooney, 2005), strategic and performance challenges that arise 
from the organization’s current context (Hambrick, 1994), and contingencies captured by 
environmental uncertainty and dynamism (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
Early work in contingency theory and organizational design (e.g., Galbraith, 1973) 
recognized that a foundational source of interdependence is the type of work performed and 
the inherent demands for specialization, coordination, and delegation. Sapienza and Gupta 
(1994) found that managers and venture capitalist investors interact more frequently when 
there is low goal congruence (due to increased coordination requirements), and less 
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frequently when the CEO has more prior start-up experience (and thus the CEO does not 
need to rely on the venture capitalist to the same extent for job knowledge). Roberts and 
Stiles (1999) provide case evidence to suggest that CEOs and board chairs are jointly 
responsible for the development of strategy, “swim in parallel” and seamlessly swap 
“swimming lanes” as circumstances dictate.  Hambrick and Cannella (2004) explore in detail 
the evolution of the chief operating officer (COO) role, and how changes in the amount and 
complexity of work of the CEO results in a higher propensity to hire a COO, particularly for 
large firms or where the CEO has extraordinary task demands. Similarly, Ren and Guo 
(2011) argued in a conceptual paper that middle managers have two essential tasks: to “pre-
screen” opportunities brought to their attention, and to exploit “policy windows” where these 
issues can be sold to upper management, resulting in the activation of the interface.  
Other scholars have focused on strategic challenges as setting the context for the 
development of SLIs. For example, Huse’s (1998) ethnography provides an indication that 
strategic challenges determine the level of communication frequency between leaders with 
internal and external stakeholders, and that the source of authority for the board largely 
depends upon the relative importance of these stakeholders, and how much they trust each 
other.  Tulimeri and Banai (2010) argue that new regulatory complexities are driving the 
CEO and CFO to work more closely together and to be more equal in power and stature, 
while Krotov (2015) comes to a similar conclusion for CIOs in arenas where informational 
technology confers competitive advantage. Closely related to strategic challenges, the 
deviation (or deterioration) of firm performance from expected standards or aspirations has 
also been shown to shape the interfaces, by either inducing the CEO to look for advice 
(McDonald & Westphal, 2003), or to perform impression management activities (Westphal, 
Park, McDonald & Hayward, 2012). For example, Heyden and colleagues (2013) showed 
that when a firm underperforms, the CEO is more likely to seek advice internally.  
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Finally, several studies have shown that turbulence and change in the external 
environment give rise to more intense interactions and communication flows among strategic 
leaders (Nath & Mahajan, 2011; Niehoff, Enz, & Grover, 1990), as well as between strategic 
leaders and internal stakeholders. For example, in a study of Chinese CEOs and their 
employees, Peng and colleagues (2016) found initial evidence to suggest that the extent to 
which CEO intellectual stimulation influenced employee perceptions of work meaningfulness 
was more pronounced when the company was performing poorly or was operating in a 
dynamic environment. Looking at the role of environmental dynamism specifically, many 
studies have considered the theoretical implications of dynamism (e.g., Arendt, Priem, & 
Ndofor, 2005; Kim et al., 2009; Waldman & Yammarino, 1999), but few tests have been 
performed. The empirical studies available indicate that in dynamic environments directive 
leadership styles are more useful for harnessing top management team heterogeneity 
(Hmieleski & Ensley, 2007), and CEOs are more likely to seek external advice (Heyden et 
al., 2013).  Further, industry uncertainty influences the extent to which tenure shapes the 
relationship between the CEO and stakeholders (Luo, Kanuri, & Andrews, 2014).   
How does the wider social context shape interfaces?  Strategic leaders are 
embedded within a broader social system and socialized order that sets the context for their 
interfaces. From our review, we deduced four key dimensions of the social context that shape 
the content of SLIs: hierarchical (the system of formal hierarchical relations in which leaders 
are embedded), relational (the broader set of informal interpersonal network ties), 
organizational (the setting such as the type of firm or environment in which strategic leaders 
are located), and cultural (the cultural norms that govern leader interactions).  
First, SLIs are shaped by the hierarchical system of relationships that determines the 
distribution of power and allocation of decision-making authority. This is most often 
observed in the interface between the CEO and the board, where the balance of power shapes 
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the fate of the CEO’s strategic proposals and actions (Deng & Hendrikse, 2015; Yoo & Reed, 
2015), and creates the potential for rivalries and conflicts (Wu, 2008). Roberts and Stiles 
(1999) noted that the challenge of establishing an effective working relationship between the 
CEO and board chair depends on their prior history of interactions. Beyond the board, the 
CEO’s position as titular head bestows them with authority to shape the composition of the 
TMT and how tasks are allocated (Kisfalvi & Pitcher, 2003; Klimoski & Koles, 2001; 
Resick, Whitman, Weingarden, & Hiller, 2009). In turn, the relative distribution of power 
within the TMT shapes the dynamics between individual executives, such as the CIO and 
CEO (Krotov, 2015), and the CMO and the TMT (Nath & Mahajan, 2011). Finally, the 
hierarchical position of middle managers enables them to serve as a key conduit, filter, and 
sense-making device for information and events flowing between the lower and top levels 
within the organization (Sun & Anderson, 2012). Their formal position also allows them to 
play a bridging and brokerage role, by screening or selling opportunities (Ren & Guo, 2011).   
Second, it has been widely recognized in past research that strategic leaders are 
embedded in a wider system of informal intra-organizational and inter-organizational 
relational networks (Balkundi & Kilduff, 2006; Chen, 2013; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; 
McDonald & Westphal, 2003). These networks facilitate interface development by giving 
leaders portals of access to contacts for advice and information (Adler & Kwon, 2002). For 
example, Westphal (1999) found that CEOs with friendship ties to the board of directors were 
inclined to confer with the board more often for strategic advice.  The external networks of 
CEOs also facilitate advice seeking for strategic issues (McDonald & Westphal, 2003), and 
serve as a source of social support (Westphal et al., 2012). However, these very same ties can 
also hinder the operation of certain interfaces, such as between the board of directors and the 
CEO. While Westphal (1999) found no evidence of such an effect, Bruynseels and Cardinaels 
(2014) found that audit committees do not monitor CEOs as rigorously when they are friends.  
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Third, organizational characteristics, such as the size, stage of development, and 
contextual features of the firm have been proposed to have a strong influence on whether and 
how frequently leaders come into contact with one another. West and Meyer (1998) 
suggested that in younger, entrepreneurial firms, CEOs would have a greater influence on the 
TMT than in older, established firms. Similarly, de Jong, Song & Song (2013) proposed that 
new ventures lack well-established structures, placing a premium on the role of founder in 
shaping interpersonal processes. Most recently, Friedman, Carmeli, & Tishler (2016) noted 
that entrepreneurial firms rely heavily on the leadership of the CEO and the TMT in strategic 
decision-making, compared to larger, more established organizations. While these arguments 
have intuitive appeal, there have been few tests of specific organizational influences on SLIs. 
Other scholars have hinted that the social context of family firms facilitates SLI development, 
by creating opportunities for interaction and minimizing the need for a formal governance 
regime (Pieper, Klein & Jaskiewicz, 2008; Zona, 2016). For example, in a study of private-
owned family enterprises in Germany, Pieper and colleagues (2008) found that goal 
alignment between owners and managers, by serving as a source of informal control, reduced 
the need for a board of directors. Similarly, the extent to which the organization emphasizes 
collegiality (de Jong et al., 2013), facilitates debate and sharing perspectives (Hmieleski & 
Ensley, 2007), and encourages continuous improvement (Adelman, 2012) can facilitate the 
development of more seamless interfaces with employees and middle managers. 
Fourth, the interfaces of strategic leaders are also shaped by the presence of shared 
national cultural values, norms, and belief systems. Aside from the fact that these cultural 
influences can limit managerial discretion (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007), variations in 
cultural norms may shape the way in which leaders interact (e.g., Bai, Li, & Xi, 2012; 
Rodriguez, 2005).  For example, Ou and colleagues (2014: 37) pointed out that that 
Confucianism and Daoism teach leaders to be self-deprecating and “lead without overtly 
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appearing to lead” and find that CEO humility leads to perceptions of empowering 
relationship which subsequently influences TMT integration. Interestingly, Li and Tang 
(2013) found that the hubris of CEOs appears to be “contagious” in a sample of Chinese 
CEOs, but the effect was not present in the US sample, which may be due to the fact that 
Chinese are more influenced by their peer group, while Preston, Karahanna, and Rowe (2005) 
find the means by which CIOs are able to effectively educate their peers in the TMT differ 
between the French and US contexts.  
Contact in SLIs 
What is intersected at the interface?  Because executives inject themselves into 
their interactions with others (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), explaining how interfaces create 
and confer influence requires accounting for what strategic leader and stakeholder attributes 
(demographics and dispositions), aspirations (interests, goals, and preferences), and activities 
(actions and role behaviors) are intersected. For the sake of clarity and space, we consider 
these intersections for each interface individually (e.g., CEO-TMT, CEO-BOD, etc.). 
Intersection of CEOs and TMTs: The single most common study “template” is how 
the attributes of CEOs influence TMT activities – in particular the level of behavioral 
integration or “teamness” (Hambrick, 1994; Simsek et al., 2005). In our review, we identified 
seven studies that examined the influence CEO leadership style (whether charismatic, 
empowering or transformational) on the tendency for the TMT to be behaviorally integrated, 
and the performance implications thereto (e.g., Carmeli et al., 2011; Simsek et al., 2005; Ling 
et al., 2008; Raes, Bruch, and de Jong, 2013). Others have studied the influence of CEO 
personality attributes on TMT dynamics and processes (Kisfalvi & Pitcher, 2003; Peterson et 
al., 2003). For example, using a novel Q-sort methodology, Peterson and colleagues (2003) 
demonstrated how CEO personality traits, such as agreeableness, neuroticism, and 
extraversion, impacted the inner workings of the TMT by shaping the level of cohesion, 
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flexibility, and group process. Similarly, in a study of technology new ventures, deJong and 
colleagues (2013) illustrate how lead founder personality influenced the level of task and 
relational conflict in the founding team.  
Intersection of CEOs and BODs: There is a similarly robust tradition of examining 
the CEO-BOD interface and the activities of the board in mitigating agency conflicts and 
altering CEO decision making (Boyd et al., 2011).  Many studies have investigated how 
boards can play an active role in guiding the CEO’s decision-making and developing their 
capabilities (e.g., Chen et al., 2013; Judge and Dobbins, 1995; Shen, 2003). Taking an 
evolutionary perspective of the CEO’s tenure, Shen (2003) theorizes how the focus and 
dynamics of the board-CEO interface shifts over time. Early in the CEO’s tenure, when the 
threat of managerial opportunism is low, the focus of the board is on developing the CEO’s 
leadership capabilities. However, as the CEO’s power base grows, the role of the board shifts 
to controlling managerial opportunism. Others, such as Chen and colleagues (2013: 381), 
have demonstrated how board social capital represents an “important conduit to link firms to 
critical information and essential resources” and provides a source of advice for CEOs that 
improves their capabilities and decision-making in the context of R&D.   
Findings from studies of boards in family settings have revealed that the attributes and 
make-up of the board, particularly the presence of outsiders and family members, increases 
the extent to which the board’s skills are leveraged by the CEO (Zona, 2016), and whether 
the CEO prioritizes family goals (Goel, et al., 2013). Other studies have teased apart how 
boards and CEOs both gain power through the appointment of new board members and use 
power through their position on the board (Krause & Semadeni, 2014; Roberts & Stiles, 
1999; Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Westphal, 1998). Krause and Semadeni (2014) examined the 
qualitative differences in CEO-board chair separations and found that the CEO’s career 
horizon is associated with the type of separation that occurred. Finally, a succession of 
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studies has examined how board monitoring is either aided or impeded by the nature of the 
interface between the board and top managers (e.g., Bruynseel & Cardinaels, 2014; Del Brio 
et al., 2013; Tuggle et al., 2010).  Drawing on social exchange theory, Del Brio and 
colleagues (2013) argue that the resource provision and monitoring roles of boards do not 
occur in a vacuum but within the context of their interpersonal relations with the CEO. 
Positive perceptions of CEO integrity, benevolence, and ability influence the extent to which 
directors engage in monitoring and provide resources. Others, however, have shown that 
personal relations between the board and executives can undermine the monitoring efficacy 
of the board. For example, Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2014) find consistent evidence that 
social ties formed through the network of the CEO reduces audit committee effectiveness.  
Intersections of CEOs and individual executives: A growing body of research has 
begun to profile the intersection of CEOs and TMTs with individual, specialized functional 
executives within the TMT (for a related review, see Menz, 2012). Research on individual 
executive interfaces tended to focus on relational dynamics with the CEO, such as the level of 
mutual understanding and alignment (Johnson & Lederer, 2005; 2010), relational quality 
(Krotov, 2015), interpersonal trust (Zhen, Xuan, & Jing, 2012), social capital (Karahanna & 
Preston, 2013), and effectiveness (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004). A particularly promising 
direction has been studies that unravel the conditions under which functional executives 
acquire and maintain structural power and decision-making influence within the TMT (Klaus, 
Edvardsson, Keiningham & Gruber, 2014; Nath & Mahajan, 2011). 
 Intersections of strategic leaders and internal stakeholders: In terms of the internal-
SLI interfaces, a focus of research has been on the wider implications of CEO and TMT 
leadership style throughout the organization (Bai et al., 2012; Berson, Da’as & Waldman, 
2015; Huang, Cheng & Chou, 2005; Niehoff et al., 1990; Raes et al., 2013; Sun & Anderson, 
2012).  For the most part, these studies have traced the implications of CEO’s 
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transformational or empowering leadership style for employee outcomes, such as shared 
vision (Berson et al., 2015), perceived organizational support (Bai et al., 2012), employee-
organization value fit (Huang et al., 2005), and commitment, satisfaction, and role clarity 
(Niehoff et al., 1990). Others have demonstrated how leaders create voice opportunity for 
employees through visibility, approachability, and the use of both formal and informal 
communication channels (Adelman, 2012), and how the level of behavioral integration at the 
TMT level converts into greater levels of productive energy among employees (Raes et al., 
2013). Concerning the TMT-middle manager interface (e.g., Raes et al., 2007, 2011), 
research shows that middle manager perceptions of support is influenced by the 
complementary leadership styles of the CEO and the TMT (Song et al., 2014). 
Intersection of strategic leaders and external stakeholders: Research on the interface 
of strategic leaders and external stakeholders has a long tradition in social network theory and 
resource dependence theory (for a review, see Hillman, Withers, and Collins, 2009).  While 
studies of the external social networks and resource linkage roles of CEOs, TMTs, and board 
provide a useful starting point for understanding the strategic leader-external interface, they 
have tended to take an aggregate view of the interface without delving into the individual 
dynamics between specific strategic leaders and external stakeholders.  Although we know 
that these linkages represent conduits of information, influences, and resources, relatively few 
studies have delved into micro-dynamics of these interfaces.  
 Some recent studies have begun to shine a light into the black box of the strategic 
leader- external stakeholder interface. In a conceptual paper, Fanelli and Misangyi (2006: 
1058) theorized how the CEO’s charisma represents a means of influence in the relationship 
between the CEO and external stakeholders by affording the CEO “needed salience in the 
competition for outsiders’ attention and evaluation.” Empirically, a few studies have 
investigated the micro-dynamics of strategic leaders’ external interfaces such as Westphal 
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and colleagues’ (2012) study of impression management exchanges between CEOs of 
different firms, and how these supportive behaviors influenced the favorability of journalists’ 
evaluations of CEOs following negative earnings surprises.   
What are the manifestations of interface? The manifestations of SLIs can be 
described in terms of the frequency of interaction (how often strategic leaders and 
stakeholders interact), the mode of interaction (whether interaction is virtual or face-to-face), 
and the scope of interaction (whether a series of bilateral exchanges or one all-inclusive 
multi-lateral exchange and interaction). Because these variables are rarely specified or 
measured, our discussion is limited to inferences based upon author’s arguments and 
assumptions to discern the main patterns of SLI manifestations. First, consistent with the 
view that the work of strategic leaders is ill-structured and ambiguous (Hambrick, 1989; 
Mintzberg, 1973), most authors operate on the assumption that the interface among leaders is 
ongoing, with few clear demarcations between episodes of contact (cf., Raes et al., 2011). In 
contrast to interfaces among leaders, interfaces of strategic leaders and external stakeholders 
are more periodic, and tend to be dictated by exogenous events, such as changes in the 
environment or performance shocks. Second, the majority of studies are limited in scope to 
bilateral interactions, treating each interface separately. While some studies have tracked the 
cascading influence of CEOs on middle managers via TMTs (e.g., Ou et al., 2014), we are 
not aware of any studies that examine the multilateral, simultaneous, and reciprocal 
interactions of multiple strategic leaders. Finally, despite the proliferation of new forms of 
communication, we found very little reference to the mode or channel through which 
strategic leaders interact. All told, there has been little attention to the manifestations of SLIs 
in terms of frequency, mode, and scope.  
What is the nature of influence at the interface? Building on prior theories and 
definitions of leadership, a core feature of our definition of SLIs is that they are consequential 
Interfaces of Strategic Leaders  23 
 
in influencing firm behavior, actions, processes, and outcomes. The concept of influence 
mechanisms captures the type, direction, and pattern of that influence.   
Influence type: Influence type represents the basis and nature of influence, whether 
socio-cognitive (e.g., CEO shaping the mental models of the TMT through sense-making 
activities), regulatory (e.g., the board chair improving the self-efficacy of the CEO by setting 
challenging goals), political (e.g., CEO lobbying the board for support for a strategic 
initiative), behavioral (e.g., CEO coordinating the contributions of TMT members) or 
cultural (e.g. CEO enculturating values among employees through role modelling).  
To begin, the parties that comprise SLIs often interact for the purposes of sharing, 
consolidating, and processing information. To accomplish these goals, the parties engage in 
socio-cognitive activities such as information processing, sense making, and sense giving. 
Johnson and Lederer (2005) examined the role of communication frequency and channel 
richness on the convergence between the CEO and CIO, and found that while communication 
frequency predicted convergence, channel richness did not. Consistent with this, Miller, 
Hickson and Wilson’s (2008) case analysis illustrates that CEOs and the stakeholders deemed 
as “core heavy weights” (high in involvement and influence) can jointly construct the most 
salient aspects of a strategic decision. In so doing, they act as carriers and interpreters of the 
organizational memory. A range of studies on CEO transformational leadership, have 
theorized that CEOs play a critical socio-cognitive role in “intellectually stimulating” 
members of the TMT, and the wider organization, to view and frame problems from different 
perspectives and to come up with novel solutions to problems (de Jong et al., 2013; Friedman 
et al., 2016; Ling et al., 2008; Sun & Anderson, 2012). 
 Beyond the transfer and interpretation of information, SLIs are a vehicle to motivate 
counterparties to collaborate, work together, and share insights. To achieve these objectives, 
socio-regulatory activities such as goal regulation, performance monitoring, or empowerment 
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can be undertaken. For example, in a study of the relationship between TMT social 
integration and organizational ambidexterity, Jansen, George, Van den Bosch and Volberda 
(2008) found the effects of social integration were strengthened in the presence of 
transformational leaders, who through role modelling behaviors enabled the “synergetic and 
integrative efforts of socially integrated teams [to] permeate across hierarchical levels” (p. 
990). Bringing middle managers into the picture, Song and colleagues (2014) find that middle 
managers who perceive top managers as providing support and social exchange are motivated 
to perform better. Furthermore, CEOs who exhibit caring leadership will motivate middle 
managers, who will gratefully reciprocate with higher performance and dedication. Taking an 
agency perspective, Zona (2014) illustrates that boards play a role in motivating long-tenured 
CEOs, otherwise pre-occupied with the status quo, to invest in R&D.  
Interface participants may also rely upon socio-behavioral activities such as 
mobilizing resources, coordinating actions, developing trust and pro-social actions. For 
instance, Simsek and colleagues (2005) demonstrate how collectivistic CEOs create a 
collaborative and behaviorally integrated environment for their TMTs. Yucel, McMillan, and 
Richard (2014) found that Turkish TMTs express less normative and affective commitment 
when their CEOs exhibits moderate levels of transformational leadership in comparison to 
low or high levels of transformational leadership. It has also been widely espoused that CEOs 
influence their immediate cadre of executives through socio-behavioral means, notably 
motivating individuals to cooperate with each other and engage in more intensive exchanges 
(Friedman et al., 2016). This is evidenced in the findings of studies, such as Ou and 
colleagues (2014), which show that CEO transformational leadership fosters high levels of 
TMT integration, with spillover consequences at middle and lower organizational levels.  
The use of these behavioral mechanisms within an organization can be so consistent 
and pervasive (or not) that it generates a common sense of purpose and culture. These socio-
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cultural mechanisms of influence include discourse, acculturation, and other symbolic 
processes which allows the interactions within and between strategic leaders to cascade to the 
rest of the organization.  For example, Hayibor and colleagues (2011) found that when the 
TMT members had similar values to their CEO, they were more likely to perceive the CEO 
as charismatic. This alignment of goals and beliefs appears to make it easier for TMT 
members to “drink the Kool-aid.” Examining how these influences can affect the greater 
organization, Liao and Subramony (2008) showed that to the extent that the senior leadership 
team was customer orientated, employees exhibited a similar customer orientation for three 
different functional roles (customer contact, production, and support).   
Due to the socio-political forces at the interface, parties will often engage in behaviors 
to advance or protect their interests. For example, Enns and colleagues’ (2003) study of 
influence tactics how CIOs worked to push IT issues further up the agenda and found a wide 
range of influence behaviors were used, including rational persuasion, consultation, 
ingratiation, personal appeals, exchange, coalition tactics, and pressure. Taking the 
perspective of the CEO, Zhang and colleagues (2015) dug deeper into the implications of 
transformational leadership and found that individualized attention by transformational 
leaders was harmful because it created perceptions of favoritism (group level 
transformational leadership behavior had the expected positive effect). Westphal and Zajac 
(1995) revealed that the relative balance of power between the CEO and the current board 
had a significant influence on whether new board members would be sourced from other 
insider- or outsider- dominated boards. Huse (1998) reported that the board’s relationship 
with stakeholders was somewhat transitive depending upon the balance of power between the 
stakeholders and the top managers. 
Influence direction: Influence direction represents whether the direction of influence 
is upward (e.g., the TMT influencing the CEO or board), downwards (e.g., the CEO 
Interfaces of Strategic Leaders  26 
 
influencing employees), or lateral (e.g., the CFO influencing the CMO). Consistent with the 
broader literature on strategic leadership, studies on inter-SLI interfaces have examined the 
downward influences of CEO behaviors, actions, and leadership styles on top manager, 
middle manager, or employee attitudes, behaviors, and outcomes (e.g., de Jong et al., 2013; 
Ling et al., 2008; Ou et al., 2014; Simsek et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2015).  
A few studies have also considered upward influences and typically fall into two 
categories: studies examining how CEOs attempt to directly shape or curry favor with the 
board of directors, and studies of the upward influences of middle managers on top managers.  
With respect to the former category, Westphal (1998) found that changes in board structure 
that increase the board’s independence from management are associated with higher levels of 
CEO ingratiation and persuasion behaviors towards board members; and that these upward 
influences offset the effect of enhanced board independence on corporate strategy and CEO 
compensation. Others, such as Sauerwald and colleagues (2016) have shown how powerful 
CEOs can control the director selection process, remove directors, and limit their career 
prospects at other firms.  In the latter category, a range of studies have shown how middle 
managers play a championing role selling issues and opportunities to top managers (Ren & 
Guo, 2011).  Research on lateral influences typically includes studies of the interface between 
individual functional executives and the CEO (e.g., Enns et al., 2003; Krotov, 2015), or 
between strategic leaders and external stakeholders (Dai et al., 2014). Finally, studies 
examining multi-directional influences are rare, and typically deal with power struggles 
between the CEO/TMT and board (e.g., Kor, 2006, Westphal & Zajac, 1995), or push-back 
on CEO’s initiatives from the TMT (Costanzo & Di Domenico, 2015).  
Influence pattern: By influence pattern, we mean whether the influence of leaders on 
others is enabling (e.g., the CEO encourages the TMT to take risks), constraining (e.g., the 
board limits the managerial discretion of the CEO), or more complex.  For the most part, 
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there has been a subtle but prevalent assumption that leaders have an enabling influence by 
facilitating the achievement of organizational goals. A focus on the enabling role of CEOs is 
particularly typical of studies that examine the socio-regulatory influences of CEO 
transformational leadership on TMTs and employees. By engaging in transformational and 
charismatic behaviors, CEOs empower their immediate cadre of executives to achieve 
ambitious, sometimes audacious, aspirations (Colbert, Kristof-Brown, Bradley, & Barrick, 
2008; Jansen et al., 2008; Ling et al., 2008). CEOs can also have an enabling influence on 
TMT members by providing the TMT with the latitude to act consistent with their capabilities 
(Carmeli & Paulus, 2015), encouraging collaboration (Carmeli et al., 2011; Jansen et al., 
2008), and fostering cohesion (Waldman & Yammarino, 1999). With respect to the CEO-
board interface, boards may have an enabling influence on CEOs by engaging in mentoring 
activities (Shen, 2003), providing the CEO with the resources to invest in innovation (Chen, 
2013).  And interfaces between CEOs and external stakeholders may also be enabling by 
providing access to information (Luo et al., 2014) and by offering CEOs support under 
hostile conditions (Westphal et al., 2012).  
However, several studies have also documented how interfaces between strategic 
leaders and stakeholders may constrain rather than enable task and goal accomplishment.  
The biggest source of constraint is observed at the CEO-board interface, where boards can 
potentially limit the latitude of action of CEOs (Judge & Dobbins, 1995), discourage 
experimentation (Zona, 2014), veto the CEO’s strategic initiatives and proposals (Deng & 
Hendrikse, 2015), and suppress the CEO’s innate predilections (Goel et al., 2013).  By 
extension, CEOs might also constrain the creativity and ingenuity of the TMT by imposing 
their own perspectives (Pitcher & Smith, 2001) or by oversteering TMT members towards the 
pursuit of short-term goals (Costanzo & Di Domenico, 2015). Similarly, even as advice 
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networks might be enabling, they can also result in cognitive lock-in, making it hard for 
CEOs to break out of their modes of thinking (McDonald & Westphal, 2003). 
Consequences of SLIs 
What are the proximal impacts of interfaces?  SLIs have been shown to explain 
and predict strategic change and entrepreneurial activity, R&D investment, and decision 
quality. Ling and colleagues (2008) found that the CEO transformational leadership 
facilitated the development of three different TMT behaviors - decentralization of 
responsibilities, a risk-taking propensity, and a long-term compensation philosophy - that in 
turn facilitated the pursuit of corporate entrepreneurship. Costanzo and Di Domenico (2015: 
502) reported that while the CEO of the venture initially lacked entrepreneurial drive and 
imposed existing roles onto the TMT, a “dialectical–paradox” of tension was created via 
misfit with the market and ultimately resolved itself through upheaval and strategic change. 
Yoo and Reed (2015) found that for TMTs dominated by within-industry hires, the presence 
of outside directors was associated with resource substitution strategies in comparison to 
resource imitation strategies (which they use as a measure of strategic conformance).  
With respect to R&D investment, Chen and colleagues (2013) found board social 
capital diminishes the negative relationship between CEO tenure and R&D investment and 
enhances the positive relationship between CEO education and R&D.  Similarly, Chen (2014) 
found that powerful CEOs are able to harness the board’s education, industry-specific 
experience, and interlocking directorate ties to enhance the level of firm R&D activity.   
However, these findings must be tempered in the light of Kor’s (2006) examination of the 
power struggles between the TMT and the board of directors. She found negative interactions 
between TMT tenure, TMT shared experience, and functional diversity and the outsider 
board member ratio when predicting the level of R&D investments.  
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 Lastly, in terms of decision quality, Raes and colleagues (2011) provides a compelling 
summary of the likely effects of the top management team processes on middle management 
functioning and the resultant implications for both strategic decision quality as well as the 
quality of decision implementation.  In an empirical study, Lin and Rababah (2014) find that 
CEO-TMT exchange processes correlate with TMT psychological empowerment, which 
results in higher quality decisions as assessed by the group. Similarly, Friedman and 
colleagues (2016) find that CEO transformational leadership is able to enhance the team’s 
decision comprehensiveness through the development of a behaviorally integrated team. 
What are the distal impacts of interfaces? Not only are SLIs important for 
understanding the strategic choices that leaders make, but also for firm outcomes and 
performance. For example, Colbert and colleagues (2008) examine the goal congruence of 
the CEO with the TMT and find that transformational leadership does increase goal 
congruence, and that this congruence is related to overall organizational performance 
(measured by ROA). In the context of new ventures, Hmieleski and Ensley (2007) find that 
matching leadership type to the level of environmental dynamism is critical for making the 
most of heterogeneous TMTs, with directive leadership resulting in higher performance 
(measured by revenue and growth rates) in high dynamism environments, whereas 
empowering leadership is better suited for low dynamism environments. Looking at 
alignment more generally, Karahanna and Preston (2013) found that alignment between the 
CIO and other TMT members on information systems strategy resulted in higher levels of 
financial performance. Most recently, Georgakakis and colleagues (in press) find that TMT 
fault lines are less detrimental for performance when CEOs have shared experience, 
increased career variety, or are similar socio-demographically. 
 Turning to the relationship between strategic leaders and stakeholders, Balkundi and 
Kilduff (2006) theorized that the extent to which a leader plays a role in three networks–the 
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ego network, the organizational network and the inter-organizational network– will influence 
the efficacy of that leader in achieving desired outcomes (including survival, growth and 
innovation).  Empirically, these arguments were explored by Luo and colleagues (2014), who 
showed that as the CEO progresses through the seasons of their tenure and switches from 
mode of learning to one of holding power, the relative emphasis placed on employee and 
customer relations changes, and the extent to which these relationships are nurtured has a 
significant impact on the overall tenure to performance link.   
Collective Synthesis 
Reviewing the literature on SLIs is somewhat like trying to navigate the city of Rome 
– it is difficult to know where to start and finish, and the sprawling development makes it 
challenging to connect insights across the different research streams and theoretical 
traditions. Our goal with this review was to endeavour to synthesize key research themes, 
concepts and insights across the various sub-fields that constitute this literature. To illustrate 
the overall trends across the various themes and concepts in our organizing framework, we 
provide a tabular summary in Figure 3 and a representative sample of thirty articles in 
Appendix 1 as a summary of the prior work. From Figure 3, we can observe the areas of SLIs 
that have received more and less scholarly attention in the literature, and can further deduce 
what is known and unknown about SLIs.  Building from this descriptive summary which 
shows what has (or has not) been studied in detail, we now elucidate some of the key 
findings, ambiguities and unknowns in the literature, and potential inconsistencies in the 
existing evidence that need resolution. 
--- Insert Figure 3 about here --- 
A first major take-away is that studying the attributes, aspirations, and activities of 
strategic leaders in isolation can be an inadequate lens to describe, explain, and predict the 
influence of strategic leaders.  In study after study, we found that leader attributes, 
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aspirations, and activities have vastly different consequences depending on what other 
attributes, aspirations, and activities they come into contact with. This is illustrated, for 
example, in studies that have found that the impact of CEO tenure on R&D intensity varies 
depending upon the level of board human and social capital (Chen, 2013; Chen et al., 2013), 
that the influence of transformational and empowering CEO leadership on performance 
depends upon whether the CEO and TMT members differ in their informational 
demographics and tenure (Ling, Wei, Klimoski & Wu, 2015), and that CEO networks are of 
greatest benefit to ambidexterity when CEOs and TMTs have a high degree of 
communication richness (Cao, Simsek & Zhang, 2010).  The results of our review support 
our initial intuition that interfaces are the means and conduits through which the aspirations, 
attributes, and activities of strategic leaders are animated, come alive, play out, and are 
transformed in social settings.  This is especially apparent in studies that illustrate how 
strategic leaders vary their actions and behaviors based on the traits of other leaders, such as 
delegating influence based on functional background expertise or locus of control similarity 
(e.g., Buyl, et al., 2014).  As an illustration of the pervasive influence of interfaces in 
organizational functioning, of the 65 empirical studies where the downward or upward 
influence of one party on another were discussed or hypothesized (out of a total of 74 
studies, which also include conceptual papers), support for a significant interface-driven 
effect was found in the vast majority of the studies.    
A second finding is that interfaces are the key conduits and means by which CEO 
(and TMT) leadership cascades throughout the wider organization.  Most of scholarly 
attention on interfaces has been directed to leadership in “close quarters” (Waldman & 
Yammarino, 1999), as in the case of CEO-TMT and/or CEO-board interfaces. However, a 
growing number of studies examine the interfaces through which leadership spills over and 
cascades throughout the entire organization. Leadership cascades through a sequence of 
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interfaces in which the CEO influences the TMT, the TMT influences middle managers, and 
middle managers influence employees (e.g. Ou et al., 2014; Raes et al. 2013; Song et al., 
2014).  Through these and other studies, we have learned that interfaces represent a key 
explanatory mechanism through which influence is conveyed, perceptions and impressions 
are formed, and by which the attributes, aspirations, and activities of strategic leaders 
permeate the wider organization and beyond.  Indeed, we located eight studies that 
simultaneously considered both interfaces among strategic leaders (CEO, BOD, and TMT) 
and other internal or external stakeholders, with several discussing or testing the “knock-on” 
effects of one interface on another. 
Third, our review sheds light on the ways in which the board of directors can serve as 
a constraint, catalyst, and a complement to the CEO and wider TMT.  Viewed from the lens 
of agency theory, boards are often seen as constraint upon the agency of CEOs (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976), limiting the range of actions and behaviors in which they can engage, as 
exemplified in Gulati and Westphal’s (1999) study of how distrust between the CEO and the 
board can limit the extent to which CEOs engage in alliance formation.  But our review also 
found that boards can serve as a catalyst, by developing the leadership competences of 
CEOs (Shen, 2003), and by improving the action capability of the entire management team 
(Kim et al. 2009). Finally, by providing complementary expertise, knowledge, and 
resources, boards can serve as a countervailing force against the biases and ingrained habits 
of CEOs (Deng & Hendrikse, 2015). As evidence of this balance, we found that while 11 
papers exclusively considered the constraining role of the board, another 10 focused on the 
potential enabling role that boards play, while others considered both effects in concert. 
Fourth, we have learned that it is nearly impossible to separate interfaces, the 
interdependencies upon which they are founded, and the social context in which they arise in 
the body of existing work.  Although our framework provides a clear delineation of these 
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elements, many of these concepts are theoretically underdeveloped and are empirically 
entangled, rendering the direction of causality ambiguous.  So, as much as we would like to 
say that these concepts can be parsed into neat, self-containing bundles, further development 
of how interfaces emerge from the co-evolution of the task and social context is needed.  
Finally, just like the city of Rome, the literature on SLIs is marked by several 
contrasts and seemingly paradoxical findings. CEO transformational leadership can empower 
and animate key processes, but they can engender dependency and cause disenfranchisement 
among some.  Social networks between CEOs and boards can improve the flow of 
information and create a supportive context, but can hinder the monitoring activities and 
vigilance. Middle managers can both facilitate and obstruct the agency of CEOs and top 
managers. The literature on top management teams is dominated by the concepts of team-
ness and collaboration but the literature on the interactions of individual members of these 
teams is often framed from the lens of power, politics, and negotiation. To fully understand 
these countervailing influences, we need to move beyond considering these facets in isolation 
towards more encompassing theories and models to determine which factors can radically 
change the implications of interface characteristics such as these—as we discuss next.  
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Building on our summary of the “big picture themes” related to SLIs, we draw from 
the “bird’s eye” view of prior research in Figure 2 and 3 to bring into sharper focus some of 
the key ambiguities, blind spots, and “known unknowns” concerning SLIs. First, one blind 
spot in our understanding of SLIs is the details of circumstances and context in which they 
emerge. While we know that interdependence is a necessary, but not always sufficient 
condition, we know considerably less about the nature or substance of these 
interdependencies, or how the strategic and social context co-evolve and conspire to shape 
the interdependencies. We offer two promising directions to advance understanding on the 
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origins and emergent dynamics of SLIs: (1) further developing the construct of 
interdependencies and (2) building process models of emergence.  
Second, interfaces occur when the attributes, aspirations, and activities of strategic 
leaders and other stakeholders come into contact. But our understanding of this contact is 
hindered by a dearth of research on the mechanisms through which interfaces convey 
influence. We identify four directions to enrich extant understanding of what happens at the 
interface: (3) specifying different forms of contact; (4) cross-fertilizing research from other 
disciplines to better ground interfaces; (5) paying greater attention to governance 
mechanisms; and (6) examining contact more holistically.  
Finally, our review has shown that SLIs are consequential for a range of proximal and 
distal outcomes. While there is significant scope to extend the range of outcomes studied in 
future research, we believe two important directions are to (7) explore the potential dark side 
of SLIs, and (8) examine the role of performance feedback processes. Below we discuss each 
of these promising future directions in detail. We present a summary of these directions and 
selected research propositions in Appendix 2.  
Developing Interdependencies  
We invoked Thompson’s (1967) taxonomy of pooled, sequential, and reciprocal 
interdependence to provide insight as to how SLIs may differ. However, it is possible that a 
more nuanced and customized taxonomy of interdependence could provide a renewed basis 
for explaining SLI dynamics and processes. Consider four alternative types of 
interdependencies: resource (e.g., CEO’s dependence on external stakeholders for access to 
resources or funding); informational (e.g., the CEO depends on the CFO for financial 
information); decisional (e.g., the TMT relies on the CEO for permission to pursue a strategic 
initiative); and psychological factors (e.g., a newly appointed CEO depends on the board for 
guidance and support). These interdependencies are not mutually exclusive, and can operate 
Interfaces of Strategic Leaders  35 
 
simultaneously, in harmony or conflict, in shaping SLIs. Their interactions will likely give 
rise to qualitatively different forms and intensities of interfaces. Consider, for example, the 
type of interface that might arise between the CEO and board when the CEO depends on the 
board for decisional authority versus when the CEO relies on the board for psychological 
support and reassurance.  By specifying the underlying nature of interdependencies at play, 
future research can better explain the emergence and evolution of SLIs.  
Building Process Models of Emergence 
We also encourage future studies on the development of multi-level process models 
that can provide a richer understanding of why and how SLIs emerge. As our review 
demonstrates, strategic leaders are nested in a strategic and social context that impose 
demands and constraints, which shape whether and to what extent strategic leaders interact 
with one another and other parties. Distinct from variance models, process models direct 
attention to the “how” and “why” effects, and help to understand the causal relationships 
between inputs and outputs (Fischer, Dietz, & Antonakis, 2017). In the case of SLIs, a multi-
level account of how strategic imperatives – emanating from the position, organization, and 
environment – co-evolve with the social context to create interdependencies would provide a 
useful starting point for understanding the genesis of interfaces. Future researchers might 
particularly leverage insights from research on micro-foundations of strategy (Felin, Foss & 
Ployhart, 2015) to understand how these various “inputs” interact to shape the formation of 
SLIs. Methodologically, so doing will require ingenuity both in the choice of research 
settings and research designs. In terms of settings, studies in new venture or founding 
contexts, or in established firms that have experienced major leadership changes, could 
provide useful backdrop to study the formation of interfaces in real-time. In terms of research 
design, we encourage in-depth longitudinal case studies, along the lines of Kisfalvi, Sergi, 
and Langley’s (2016) study of micro-dynamics, to unpack the processes underpinning 
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formation of SLIs. We also see potential merit in the use of narrative approaches, including 
autobiographies, biographies, diaries, and letters to shareholders (Mathias & Smith, 2016).  
Specifying Different Forms of Contact  
Recognizing the multifaceted forms in which strategic leaders and others engage one 
another is essential to developing higher fidelity theoretical accounts of SLI influence 
mechanisms and outcomes. From our review, two dimensions of contact seemed worthy of 
consideration, but were not examined in sufficient detail by prior studies: temporal and 
spatial. The temporal dimension of SLIs refers to the timing, frequency, and duration of 
contact (Raes et al., 2011), or whether interfaces are ongoing (no clear demarcation between 
periods of contact and non-contact), episodic (well-defined hiatuses between intensive 
periods of contact), or punctuated (where long periods of time occur between contact and 
non-contact). The temporal dimension would allow for questions to be asked about whether 
interface effects are persistent, subject to sharp discontinuities, or exhibit lock-in or 
imprinting effects. By contrast, the spatial dimension refers to whether interface captures 
contact between leaders that are close or distant. This distance can be considered in multiple 
ways, such as hierarchical level, physical, or cultural.   
Juxtaposing the temporal and spatial dimensions of contact reveals that “contact” may 
take on different forms and meanings, ranging from ongoing contact between strategic 
leaders that are physically, hierarchically, or culturally proximate to punctuated contacts that 
are physically, hierarchically, or culturally distant. In so doing, future research can alleviate 
the risks of construct misspecification and omission by providing a more comprehensive 
profile of the variety of different forms of contacts under the conceptual umbrella of SLIs, 
particularly in relation to subtler and less observable interfaces, such as between CEOs and 
employees. Above all, by defining interfaces in terms of their temporal and spatial 
parameters, future researchers can achieve better methodological fit by aligning measurement 
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and time lag features of research design with the properties of different interfaces, reducing 
the risk of Type II errors arising from measuring interfaces at the wrong level or time. This is 
one area where the literature on SLIs could benefit from greater adoption of observational 
and ethnographic approaches. Although ethnographic methods are extremely time 
consuming, they can offer deep insights through “studying events, language, rituals, 
institutions, behaviors, artifacts, and interactions” (Cunliffe, 2010: 227). Network 
ethnography, which combines well-established social network analysis with a set of 
ethnographic techniques (Berthod, Grothe-Hammer, & Sydow, 2016), may be helpful in 
capturing detailed interface process across the right actors at the right time intervals.  
Opportunities for Cross-fertilization 
In further grounding and conceptualizing periods of contact, we suggest that cross-
disciplinary research may also give us “new ways of seeing” SLIs by providing new 
constructs, tools, and vocabulary to more accurately conceptualize and capture the dynamic 
characteristics of SLIs (Shaw, 2017). Some of the greatest advances in studies of strategic 
leadership have come from “retrofitting” constructs in psychology, such as shared mental 
models, core self-evaluations, and executive values (Hambrick, 2007). Indeed, because 
interfaces are relational constructs, synthesizing research on organizational behavior and 
psychology is a natural way forward. By way of example, in a recent review of the 
psychology literature on relationship science, Finkel, Simpson, and Eastwick (2017) deduced 
fourteen principles, many of which have relevance to SLIs. The principle of integration, 
refers to “opportunities and motivations for interdependence tend to facilitate cognitive, 
affective, motivational, or behavioral merging between partners” (p. 387). Parallel concepts 
such as maintenance (exhibition of cognitions and behaviors that promote the relationship’s 
persistence over time), diagnosticity (situations that allow partners to evaluate one another’s 
true goals and motives), and uniqueness (the unique patterns that emerge when partners’ 
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qualities intersect) also seem readily applicable.  Moreover, sociological research on how 
economic power and social position translate to political influence (Walker & Rea, 2014), 
and the connections between business and political elites (Mizruchi & Marshall, 2016) can 
help researchers study the political interfaces of CEOs, boards, and top executives. The 
institutional context of the country in which strategic leaders embedded can also shape the 
content, dynamics, and types of SLIs (Olie, van Iterson, & Simsek, 2013).  
Attention to Governing Mechanisms 
While much is known about the mechanisms through which leaders in close proximity 
influence one another, we know less about how these mechanisms play out when parties to 
the interface are distant, such as the cascading influence of CEOs – either directly or 
indirectly – on employees. Although there is evidence that these effects exist, greater 
attention is required to understand the mechanisms and channels by which CEO persona and 
leadership style influences employees throughout the organization, and precisely which 
mechanisms are at play. The dominant focus has been indirect mechanisms, such as the role 
of organizational climate (Berson et al., 2015), reputation (Men, 2012), and productive 
energy (Raes et al., 2013). Less attention has been devoted to the direct channels, such as 
individual interactions between CEOs and employees, and visibility of CEOs to employees. 
Although such periods of contact may be short and infrequent, they represent opportunities 
for the CEO to shape employee perceptions through role modelling and symbolic behaviors. 
One specific direction might be to study the concept of CEO visibility to employees, 
defined as the extent to which CEO actions and behaviors are visible to rank-and-file 
employees. Another related possibility is to examine the mechanisms by which CEO and 
TMT behaviors and processes “leak out” from the executive suite. Explaining how the ‘tone 
at the top’ cascades requires greater attention to the informational and influence channels 
through which employees, at various hierarchical levels, make sense of leadership behaviors.  
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Holistic Approaches to Examining Contact 
Prior research on SLIs have typically investigated each interface in isolation, except 
for some recent studies that look at cascading leadership effects inside organizations. While 
this is understandable given the theoretical and methodological challenges entailed in 
studying phenomena at the interface, there is a need for theoretical models that examine SLIs 
in a more integrated and holistic fashion. It is logical, for example, to expect that the interface 
of the CEO and the board of directors will have spillover consequences for the interface of 
the CEO and the TMT. And by extension, the interface of the CEO and TMT will have 
consequences for the interface of the TMT and middle managers. One specific possibility 
would be to examine whether the level of information exchange and collaboration between 
the chair and independent directors influences the level of information exchange and 
collaboration between the CEO and members of the TMT.  Does collegiality and 
collaborative behavior cascade?  Or similarly, does a lack of goal alignment between the 
CEO and the board chairman have spillover consequences for the interface of the CEO and 
the TMT?  Another direction to take is to examine the circumstances under which the board 
of directors hinders the interface of the CEO and TMT, perhaps by commanding a 
disproportionate share of the CEO’s attention, or by interfering in key strategic processes. 
Exploring Potential Dark Sides 
For the most part, research has tended to focus on the enabling role, or “bright side” 
of SLIs. While our review also documents the constraining influence of SLIs, we are not 
aware of focused studies that have considered the potential negative consequences. Although 
interfaces are purposive to facilitate the transfer of knowledge, resources, advice, and 
support, the fact that they engender dependence might lead to power struggles that could slow 
down decision-making or otherwise hinder the quality of decision-making. It is also possible 
that interdependence, particularly of a psychological variety, might have a range of 
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dysfunctional outcomes, as well as the potential for ethical or legal lapses. From a modularity 
perspective, systems composed of tightly coupled components are more susceptible to 
disruption and a threshold level of instability that can cascade out of control (Perrow, 1984). 
Interfaces might, thus, act as “carriers” of contagion effects, such as a dysfunctional 
personality traits or negative interactions, such as executive narcissism and hubris, “leak out” 
from the executive suite and become acculturated in the wider organization and beyond.  
Modeling Feedback Processes 
A convenient assumption in most treatments of SLIs is that they have reached a 
steady rate of equilibration, in which the level of interdependence, influence mechanisms, 
and outcomes have crystallized (Simsek et al., 2015).  But SLIs can also operate in a more 
fragile state of equilibrium and can be transformed by feedback processes. As an example, 
consider the issues of how a deviation from performance aspirations might shift the interface 
between the CEO and the board, or the board and external stakeholders. A performance 
deviation, either positive or negative, might alter the interface by increasing or decreasing the 
level of interdependency, or by altering the attributes, aspirations, and activities of 
leaders/stakeholders party to the interface. Leadership traits and emotions, such as aggression 
or anxiety that otherwise remain latent might be activated because of feedback processes. 
This activation may then destabilize the interface. Thus, greater attention to feedback 
processes in SLIs is clearly warranted.  
Conclusions 
In closing, the theme of the 77th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, 
“At the Interface,” provided an opportune time to reflect upon, and to rejuvenate decades of 
rich but scattered inquiry on SLIs. To that end, we first provided an encompassing definition 
to anchor studies across levels, units, and theories. Second, we advanced a framework to 
organize and synthesize what is currently known, or knowable about SLIs from extant 
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research. Based on the framework and review, we finally highlighted several direction ripe 
for further theorizing and testing. Together, we are hopeful that the review will help to 
establish SLIs as the next frontier of strategic leadership research and reaffirm their 
importance for understanding how and why executives do what they do to shape firm 
behavior and performance.  
   
Interfaces of Strategic Leaders  42 
 
REFERENCES  
Adelman, K. 2012. Promoting employee voice and upward communication in healthcare: The CEO's 
influence. Journal of Healthcare Management, 57:133-148. 
Adler, P. S., & Kwon, S. W. 2002. Social capital: Prospects for a new concept. Academy of 
Management Review, 27: 17-40. 
Albers, S., Wohlgezogen, F., & Zajac, E. J. 2016. Strategic alliance structures: An organization design 
perspective. Journal of Management, 42: 582-614. 
Alexiev, A. S., Jansen, J. J., Van den Bosch, F. A., & Volberda, H. W. 2010. Top management team 
advice seeking and exploratory innovation: The moderating role of TMT heterogeneity. Journal of 
Management Studies, 47: 1343-1364. 
Araujo, L., Dubois, A., & Gadde, L. E. 1999. Managing interfaces with suppliers. Industrial Marketing 
Management, 28: 497-506. 
Arendt, L. A., Priem, R. L., & Ndofor, H. A. 2005. A CEO-adviser model of strategic decision making. 
Journal of Management, 31: 680-699. 
Ashenbaum, B., & Terpend, R. 2010. The purchasing-logistics interface: A "scope of responsibility" 
taxonomy. Journal of Business Logistics, 31: 177-194. 
Bai, Y., Li, P. P., & Xi, Y. 2012. The distinctive effects of dual-level leadership behaviors on 
employees’ trust in leadership: An empirical study from China. Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management, 29: 213-237. 
Balkundi, P., & Kilduff, M. 2006. The ties that lead: A social network approach to leadership. The 
Leadership Quarterly, 17: 419-439. 
Barnard, C. 1938. The functions of the executive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
Berenson, C. 1968. R and D - marketing interface - General analogue model for technology diffusion. 
Journal of Marketing, 32: 8-15. 
Berson, Y., Da'as, R., & Waldman, D. A. 2015. How do leaders and their teams bring about 
organizational learning and outcomes? Personnel Psychology, 68: 79-108. 
Berthod O., Grothe-Hammer, M., & Sydow, J. in press. Network ethnography: A mixed-method 
approach for the study of practices in interorganizational settings. Organizational Research 
Methods. DOI: 10.1177/1094428116633872 
Botelho, E.L., Powell, K.R., Kincaid S., & Wang D. 2017. What sets successful CEOs apart? Harvard 
Business Review, 95(3): 70-77.  
Boyd, B. K., Haynes, K. T., & Zona, F. 2011. Dimensions of CEO–board relations. Journal of 
Management Studies, 48: 1892-1923. 
Bromiley, P., & Rau, D. 2016. Social, behavioral, and cognitive influences on upper echelons during 
strategy process: A literature review. Journal of Management, 42: 174-202. 
Bruynseels, L. & Cardinaels, E. 2014. The Audit Committee: Management Watchdog or Personal 
Friend of the CEO?. The Accounting Review, 89(1): 113-145. 
Buyl, T., Boone, C., & Hendriks, W. 2014. Top management team members’ decision influence and 
cooperative behaviour: An empirical study in the information technology industry. British Journal 
of Management, 25: 285-304. 
Buyl, T., Boone, C., Hendriks, W., & Matthyssens, P. 2011. Top management team functional diversity 
and firm performance: The moderating role of CEO characteristics. Journal of Management Studies, 
48: 151-177. 
Cao, Q., Simsek, Z., & Zhang, H. 2010. Modelling the joint impact of the CEO and the TMT on 
organizational ambidexterity. Journal of Management Studies, 47: 1272-1296. 
Interfaces of Strategic Leaders  43 
 
 
Carmeli, A., & Paulus, P. B. 2015. CEO ideational facilitation leadership and team creativity: The 
mediating role of knowledge sharing. The Journal of Creative Behavior, 49: 53-75. 
Carmeli, A., Schaubroeck, J., & Tishler, A. 2011. How CEO empowering leadership shapes top 
management team processes: Implications for firm performance. Leadership Quarterly, 22: 399-
411. 
Carmeli, A., Tishler, A., & Edmondson, A. C. 2012. CEO relational leadership and strategic decision 
quality in top management teams: The role of team trust and learning from failure. Strategic 
Organization, 10: 31-54. 
Chen, H. L. 2013. CEO tenure and R&D investment: The moderating effect of board capital. The 
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 49: 437-459. 
Chen, H. L. 2014. Board capital, CEO power and R&D investment in electronics firms. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 22: 422-436. 
Chen, H. L., Ho, M. H. C., & Hsu, W. T. 2013. Does board social capital influence chief executive 
officers' investment decisions in research and development? R&D Management, 43: 381-393. 
Colbert, A. E., Kristof-Brown, A. L., Bradley, B. H., & Barrick, M. R. 2008. CEO transformational 
leadership: The role of goal importance congruence in top management teams. Academy of 
Management Journal, 51: 81-96. 
Cornforth, C., & MacMillan, R. 2016. Evolution in board chair-CEO relationships: A negotiated order 
perspective. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 45: 949-970 
Costanzo, L. A., & Di Domenico, M. 2015. A multi‐level dialectical–paradox lens for top management 
team strategic decision‐making in a corporate venture. British Journal of Management, 26: 484-506. 
Crossland, C., & Hambrick, D. C. 2007. How national systems differ in their constraints on corporate 
executives: A study of CEO effects in three countries. Strategic Management Journal, 28: 767-789. 
Cunliffe, A. L. 2010. Retelling tales of the field in search of organizational ethnography 20 years on. 
Organizational Research Methods, 13: 224-239. 
Dai, J., Montabon, F. L., & Cantor, D. E. 2014. Linking rival and stakeholder pressure to green supply 
management: Mediating role of top management support. Transportation Research Part E: 
Logistics and Transportation Review, 71: 173-187. 
de Blok, C., Meijboom, B., Luijkx, K., Schols, J., & Schroeder, R. 2014. Interfaces in service 
modularity: A typology developed in modular health care provision. Journal of Operations 
Management, 32: 175-189. 
de Jong, A., Song, M., & Song, L. Z. 2013. How lead founder personality affects new venture 
performance: The mediating role of team conflict. Journal of Management, 39: 1825-1854. 
de Ruyter, K., & Wetzels, M. 2000. Customer equity considerations in service recovery: a cross-
industry perspective. International Journal of Service Industry Management, 11: 91-108. 
Del Brio, E.B., Yoshikawa, T., Connelly, C.E., & Tan, W.L. 2013. The effects of CEO trustworthiness 
on directors' monitoring and resource provision.  Journal of Business Ethics, 118: 155 - 169. 
Deng, W., & Hendrikse, G. W. 2015. Managerial vision bias and cooperative governance. European 
Review of Agricultural Economics, 42: 797-828. 
Enns, H. G., Huff, S. L., & Golden, B. R. 2003. CIO influence behaviors: the impact of technical 
background. Information & Management, 40: 467-485. 
Fanelli, A., & Misangyi, V. F. 2006. Bringing out charisma: CEO charisma and external stakeholders. 
Academy of Management Review, 31: 1049-1061. 
Felin, T., Foss, N. J., & Ployhart, R. E. 2015. The Microfoundations movement in strategy and 
organization theory. Academy of Management Annals, 9: 575-632. 
Interfaces of Strategic Leaders  44 
 
Fischer, T., Dietz, J., & Antonakis, J. 2017. Leadership process models: A review and synthesis. 
Journal of Management, 43: 1726-1753. 
Finkel, E.J., Simpson, J.A., & Eastwick, P.W. 2017. The psychology of close relationships: Fourteen 
core principles. Annual Review of Psychology, 68: 383-411.   
Foo, M. D., Sin, H. P., & Yiong, L. P. 2006. Effects of team inputs and intrateam processes on 
perceptions of team viability and member satisfaction in nascent ventures. Strategic Management 
Journal, 27: 389-399. 
Freeman, R.E. 1984. Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Boston, MA: Pitman.  
Friedman, Y., Carmeli, A. & Tishler, A. 2016. How CEOs and TMTs build adaptive capacity in small 
entrepreneurial firms. Journal of Management Studies, 53: 996–1018. 
Galbraith, J.R. 1973. Designing complex organizations. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley Longman 
Publishing Company.  
Geletkanycz, M. A., & Hambrick, D. C. 1997. The external ties of top executives: Implications for 
strategic choice and performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42: 654-681. 
Georgakakis, D., Hayden, M. L. M., & Ruigrok, W. 2015. The CEO-TMT interface in upper echelons 
research: A review, synthesis, and research agenda.  Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
Academy of Management, Vancouver, Canada. 
Georgakakis, D., Greve, P., & Ruigrok, W. (In press). Top management team faultlines and firm 
performance: Examining the CEO-TMT interface. Leadership 
Quarterly, doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2017.03.004. 
Goel, S., Voordeckers, W., Van Gils, A., & van den Heuvel, J. 2013. CEO's empathy and salience of 
socioemotional wealth in family SMEs–The moderating role of external directors. Entrepreneurship 
& Regional Development, 25: 111-134. 
Gulati, R., & Westphal, J. D. 1999. Cooperative or controlling? The effects of CEO-board relations and 
the content of interlocks on the formation of joint ventures. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44: 
473-506. 
Hambrick, D. C. 1989. Putting top managers back in the strategy picture - Introduction. Strategic 
Management Journal, 10: 5-15. 
Hambrick, D. C. 1994. Top management groups: A conceptual integration and reconsideration of the 
team label. In B. M. Staw & L. L. Cummings (Eds.), Research in Organizational Behavior, 16: 171-
214. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Hambrick, D. C. 2007. Upper echelons theory: An update. Academy of Management Review, 32: 334-
343. 
Hambrick, D. C., & Cannella, A. A. 2004. CEOs who have COOs: Contingency analysis of an 
unexplored structural form. Strategic Management Journal, 25: 959-979. 
Hambrick, D. C., Finkelstein, S., & Mooney, A. C. 2005. Executive job demands: New insights for 
explaining strategic decisions and leader behaviors. Academy of Management Review, 30: 472-491. 
Hambrick, D.C. & Mason, P.A., 1984. Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top 
managers. Academy of Management Review, 9: 193-206. 
Hayibor, S., Agle, B. R., Sears, G. J., Sonnenfeld, J. A., & Ward, A. 2011. Value congruence and 
charismatic leadership in CEO–top manager relationships: An empirical investigation. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 102: 237-254. 
Heinz, H., & Ramezani-Dakhel, H. 2016. Simulations of inorganic-bioorganic interfaces to discover 
new materials: insights, comparisons to experiment, challenges, and opportunities. Chemical Society 
Reviews, 45: 412-448. 
Interfaces of Strategic Leaders  45 
 
Heyden, M. L. M., van Doorn, S., Reimer, M., Van den Bosch, F. A. J., & Volberda, H. W. 2013. 
Perceived environmental dynamism, relative competitive performance, and top management team 
heterogeneity: Examining correlates of upper echelons' advice-seeking. Organization Studies, 34: 
1327-1356. 
Hillman, A., & Keim, G. 1995. International variation in the business-government interface - 
institutional and organizational considerations. Academy of Management Review, 20: 193-214. 
Hillman, A. J., Withers, M. C., & Collins, B. J. 2009. Resource dependence theory: A review. Journal 
of Management, 35: 1404-1427. 
Hmieleski, K. M., & Ensley, M. D. 2007. A contextual examination of new venture performance: 
entrepreneur leadership behavior, top management team heterogeneity, and environmental 
dynamism. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 28: 865-889. 
Huang, M. P., Cheng, B. S., & Chou, L. F. 2005. Fitting in organizational values: The mediating role of 
person-organization fit between CEO charismatic leadership and employee outcomes. International 
Journal of Manpower, 26: 35-49. 
Huse, M. 1998. Researching the dynamics of board—stakeholder relations. Long Range Planning, 31: 
218-226. 
Jansen, J. J., George, G., Van den Bosch, F. A., & Volberda, H. W. 2008. Senior team attributes and 
organizational ambidexterity: The moderating role of transformational leadership. Journal of 
Management Studies, 45: 982-1007. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. 1976. Theory of firm - Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-360. 
Johnson, A. M., & Lederer, A. L. 2005. The effect of communication frequency and channel richness 
on the convergence between chief executive and chief information officers. Journal of Management 
Information Systems, 22: 227-252. 
Johnson, A. M., & Lederer, A. L. 2010. CEO/CIO mutual understanding, strategic alignment, and the 
contribution of IS to the organization. Information & Management, 47: 138-149. 
Judge, W. Q., & Dobbins, G. H. 1995. Antecedents and effects of outside director's awareness of CEO 
decision style. Journal of Management, 21: 43-64. 
Karahanna, E., & Preston, D. S. 2013. The effect of social capital of the relationship between the CIO 
and top management team on firm performance. Journal of Management Information Systems, 30: 
15-56. 
Kim, B., Burns, M. L., & Prescott, J. E. 2009. The Strategic Role of the Board: The Impact of Board 
Structure on Top Management Team Strategic Action Capability. Corporate Governance-an 
International Review, 17: 728-743. 
Kisfalvi, V., & Pitcher, P. 2003. Doing what feels right - The influence of CEO character and emotions 
on top management team dynamics. Journal of Management Inquiry, 12: 42-66. 
Kisfalvi, V., Sergi, V., & Langley, A. 2016. Managing and mobilizing micro-dynamics to achieve 
behavioral integration in top management teams. Long Range Planning, 49: 427-446. 
Klaus, P., Edvardsson, B., Keiningham, T. L., & Gruber, T. 2014. Getting in with the "In" crowd: How 
to put marketing back on the CEO's agenda. Journal of Service Management, 25: 195-212. 
Klimoski, R. J., & Koles, K. L. K. 2001. The chief executive officer and top management team 
interface. In S. Zaccaro and R. Klimoski (Eds.), The nature of organizational leadership: 219-269. 
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Kor, Y. Y. 2006. Direct and interaction effects of top management team and board compositions on 
R&D investment strategy. Strategic Management Journal, 27: 1081-1099. 
Interfaces of Strategic Leaders  46 
 
Krause, R., & Semadeni, M. 2014. Last dance or second chance? Firm performance, CEO career 
horizon, and the separation of board leadership roles. Strategic Management Journal, 35: 808-825. 
Krotov, V. (2015). Bridging the CIO-CEO gap: It takes two to tango. Business Horizons, 58: 275-283. 
Li, J., & Tang, Y. 2013. The social influence of executive hubris. Management International Review, 
53: 83-107. 
Liao, H., & Subramony, M. 2008. Employee customer orientation in manufacturing organizations: Joint 
influences of customer proximity and the senior leadership team. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
93: 317-327. 
Lin, H. C., & Rababah, N. 2014. CEO–TMT exchange, TMT personality composition, and decision 
quality: The mediating role of TMT psychological empowerment. Leadership Quarterly, 25: 943-
957. 
Ling, Y., Wei, L. Q., Klimoski, R. J., & Wu, L. Z. 2015. Benefiting from CEO's empowerment of 
TMTs: Does CEO-TMT dissimilarity matter? Leadership Quarterly, 26: 1066-1079. 
Ling, Y. A. N., Simsek, Z., Lubatkin, M. H., & Veiga, J. F. 2008. Transformational leadership's role in 
promoting corporate entrepreneurship: Examining the CEO-TMT interface. Academy of 
Management Journal, 51: 557-576. 
Luo, X. M., Kanuri, V. K., & Andrews, M. 2014. How does CEO tenure matter? The mediating role of 
firm-employee and firm-customer relationships. Strategic Management Journal, 35: 492-511. 
Mannor, M. J., Wowak, A. J., Bartkus, V. O. & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. 2016, Heavy lies the crown? How 
job anxiety affects top executive decision making in gain and loss contexts. Strategic Management 
Journal, 37: 1968–1989. 
Mathias, B. D., & Smith, A. D. 2016. Autobiographies in Organizational Research: Using Leaders' Life 
Stories in a Triangulated Research Design. Organizational Research Methods, 19: 204-230. 
Mathieu, J.E., Marks, M.A., & Zaccaro, S.J. 2001. Multi-team systems. In N. Anderson, D. Ones, H.K. 
Sinangil & C. Viswesvaran, C. (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial, Work and Organizational 
Psychology: 289-313. London: Sage 
Mayhew, S. 2015. A dictionary of geography. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press 
McDonald, M. L., & Westphal, J. D. 2003. Getting by with the advice of their friends: CEOs' advice 
networks and firms' strategic responses to poor performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 48: 
1-32. 
Men, L. R. 2012. CEO credibility, perceived organizational reputation, and employee engagement. 
Public Relations Review, 38: 171-173. 
Menz, M. 2012. Functional top management team members: A review, synthesis, and research agenda. 
Journal of Management, 38: 45-80. 
Miller, S., Hickson, D., & Wilson, D. 2008. From strategy to action: involvement and influence in top 
level decisions. Long Range Planning, 41: 606-628. 
Mintzberg, H. 1973. The nature of managerial work. New York: Harper & Rowe 
Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J. 1997. Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and 
salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. Academy of Management Review, 
22: 853-886. 
Mizruchi, M. S., & Marshall, L. J. 2016. Corporate CEOs, 1890-2015: Titans, bureaucrats, and saviors. 
Annual Review of Sociology, 42: 143-163. 
Moenaert, R. K., & Souder, W. E. 1996. Context and antecedents of information utility at the 
R&D/marketing interface. Management Science, 42: 1592-1610. 
Interfaces of Strategic Leaders  47 
 
Molinari, C., Hendryx, M., & Goodstein, J. 1997. The effects of CEO-board relations on hospital 
performance. Health Care Management Review, 22: 7-15. 
Mollenkopf, D. A., Frankel, R., & Russo, I. 2011. Creating value through returns management: 
Exploring the marketing-operations interface. Journal of Operations Management, 29: 391-403. 
Murray, K. B., & Haubl, G. 2011. Freedom of choice, ease of use, and the formation of interface 
preferences. MIS Quarterly, 35: 955-976. 
Nath, P., & Mahajan, V. 2011. Marketing in the C-suite: a study of chief marketing officer power in 
firms' top management teams. Journal of Marketing, 75: 60-77. 
Nel, A. E., Madler, L., Velegol, D., Xia, T., Hoek, E. M. V., Somasundaran, P., Klaessig, F., 
Castranova, V., & Thompson, M. 2009. Understanding biophysicochemical interactions at the nano-
bio interface. Nature Materials, 8: 543-557. 
Niehoff, B. P., Enz, C. A., & Grover, R. A. 1990. The impact of top-management actions on employee 
attitudes and perceptions. Group & Organization Studies, 15: 337-352. 
Olie, R., Van Iterson, A., & Simsek, Z. 2013. When do CEOs versus top management teams matter in 
explaining strategic decision-making processes? International Studies of Management and 
Organization, 42: 86–105. 
Ou, A. Y., Tsui, A. S., Kinicki, A. J., Waldman, D. A., Xiao, Z., & Song, L. J. 2014. Humble chief 
executive officers’ connections to top management team integration and middle managers’ 
responses. Administrative Science Quarterly, 59: 34-72. 
Peng, A. C. Y., Lin, H. E., Schaubroeck, J., McDonough, E. F., Hu, B. M., & Zhang, A. G. 2016. CEO 
intellectual stimulation and employee work meaningfulness: The moderating role of organizational 
context. Group & Organization Management, 41: 203-231. 
Perrow, C. 1984. Normal accidents: Living with high-risk technologies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press  
Peterson, R. S., Smith, D. B., Martorana, P. V., & Owens, P. D. 2003. The impact of chief executive 
officer personality on top management team dynamics: One mechanism by which leadership affects 
organizational performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88: 795-808. 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. 1978. The external control of organizations. New York: Harper & Row. 
Pieper, T. M., Klein, S. B., & Jaskiewicz, P. 2008. The impact of goal alignment on board existence and 
top management team composition: Evidence from family‐influenced businesses. Journal of Small 
Business Management, 46: 372-394. 
Pitcher, P., & Smith, A. D. 2001. Top management team heterogeneity: Personality, power, and proxies. 
Organization Science, 12: 1-18. 
Preston, D. S., Karahanna, E., & Rowe, F. 2006. Development of shared understanding between the 
chief information officer and top management team in US and French organizations: A cross-
cultural comparison. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 53: 191-206. 
Protti, M., Gonzalez, V., Newman, A. V., Dixon, T. H., Schwartz, S. Y., Marshall, J. S., Feng, L. J., 
Walter, J. I., Malservisi, R., & Owen, S. E. 2014. Nicoya earthquake rupture anticipated by geodetic 
measurement of the locked plate interface. Nature Geoscience, 7: 117-121. 
Raes, A. M., Glunk, U., Heijltjes, M. G., & Roe, R. A. 2007. Top management team and middle 
managers making sense of leadership. Small Group Research, 38: 360-386. 
Raes, A. M., Heijltjes, M. G., Glunk, U., & Roe, R. A. 2011. The interface of the top management team 
and middle managers: A process model. Academy of Management Review, 36: 102-126. 
Raes, A. M., Bruch, H., & De Jong, S. B. 2013. How top management team behavioural integration can 
impact employee work outcomes: Theory development and first empirical tests. Human Relations, 
66: 167-192. 
Interfaces of Strategic Leaders  48 
 
Rau, C., Moslein, K. M., & Neyer, A. K. 2016. Playing possum, hide-and-seek, and other behavioral 
patterns: knowledge boundaries at newly emerging interfaces. R & D Management, 46: 341-353. 
Ren, C. R., & Guo, C. 2011. Middle managers’ strategic role in the corporate entrepreneurial process: 
Attention-based effects. Journal of Management, 37: 1586-1610. 
Resick, C. J., Whitman, D. S., Weingarden, S. M., & Hiller, N. J. 2009. The bright-side and the dark-
side of CEO personality: examining core self-evaluations, narcissism, transformational leadership, 
and strategic influence. Journal of Applied Psychology, 94: 1365-1381. 
Roberts, J., & Stiles, P. 1999. The relationship between chairmen and chief executives: Competitive or 
complementary roles? Long Range Planning, 32: 36-48. 
Rodríguez, C. M. 2005. Emergence of a third culture: Shared leadership in international strategic 
alliances. International Marketing Review, 22: 67-95. 
Sapienza, H.J. & Gupta, A.K. 1994. Impact of agency risks and task uncertainty on venture capitalist-
CEO interaction. Academy of Management Journal, 37: 1618-1632 
Sauerwald, S., Lin, Z. & Peng, M. W. 2016. Board social capital and excess CEO returns. Strategic 
Management Journal, 37: 498–520. 
Schaschke, C. 2014. A dictionary of chemical engineering. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press 
Shaw, J.D. 2017. Moving forward at AMJ. Academy of Management Journal, 60: 1-5. 
Shen, W. 2003. The dynamics of the CEO-board relationship: An evolutionary perspective. Academy of 
Management Review, 28: 466-476. 
Simsek, Z., Jansen, J.J.P., Minichilli, A. & Escriba-Esteve, A. 2015. Strategic leadership and leaders in 
entrepreneurial contexts. Journal of Management Studies, 52: 463-478. 
Simsek, Z., Veiga, J. F., Lubatkin, M. H., & Dino, R. N. 2005. Modeling the multilevel determinants of 
top management team behavioral integration. Academy of Management Journal, 48: 69-84. 
Song, L. J., Zhang, X., & Wu, J. B. 2014. A multilevel analysis of middle manager performance: The 
role of CEO and top manager leadership. Management and Organization Review, 10: 275-297. 
Stoker, J. I., Grutterink, H., & Kolk, N. J. 2012. Do transformational CEOs always make the difference? 
The role of TMT feedback seeking behavior. The Leadership Quarterly, 23: 582-592. 
Suddaby, R. 2010. Editor's comments: Construct clarity in theories of management and organization. 
Academy of Management Review, 35: 346-357. 
Sun, P. Y., & Anderson, M. H. 2012. The combined influence of top and middle management 
leadership styles on absorptive capacity. Management Learning, 43: 25-51. 
Thomspon, J.D. 1967. Organizations in action. New Brunswick, NJ:  Transaction Publishers  
Tuggle, C.S., Schnatterly, K., & Johnson, R.A. 2010. Attention patterns in the boardroom: How board 
composition and processes affect discussion of entrepreneurial issues. Academy of Management 
Journal, 53: 550-571.  
Tulimieri, P., & Banai, M. 2010. A new corporate paradigm: the CEO and CFO - a partnership of 
equals. Organizational Dynamics, 39: 240-247. 
Waldman, D. A., & Yammarino, F. J. 1999. CEO charismatic leadership: Levels-of-management and 
levels-of-analysis effects. Academy of Management Review, 24: 266-285. 
Walker, E. T., & Rea, C. M. 2014. The political mobilization of firms and industries. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 40: 281-304. 
West, G. P., & Meyer, G. D. 1998. To agree or not to agree? Consensus and performance in new 
ventures. Journal of Business Venturing, 13: 395-422. 
Westphal, J. D. 1998. Board games: How CEOs adapt to increases in structural board independence 
from management. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43: 511-537. 
Interfaces of Strategic Leaders  49 
 
Westphal, J. D. 1999. Collaboration in the boardroom: Behavioral and performance consequences of 
CEO-board social ties. Academy of Management Journal, 42: 7-24. 
Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. 1995. Who shall govern? CEO/board power, demographic similarity, and 
new director selection. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40: 60-83. 
Westphal, J. D., Park, S. H., McDonald, M. L., & Hayward, M. L. 2012. Helping other CEOs avoid bad 
press social exchange and impression management support among CEOs in communications with 
journalists. Administrative Science Quarterly, 57: 217-268. 
Wren, D. A. 1967. Interface and interorganizational coordination. Academy of Management Journal, 
10: 69-81. 
Wu, H. L. 2008. When does internal governance make firms innovative? Journal of Business Research, 
61: 141-153. 
Yoo, J. W., & Reed, R. 2015. The effects of top management team external ties and board composition 
on the strategic choice of late movers. Long Range Planning, 48: 23-34. 
Yucel, I., McMillan, A., & Richard, O. C. 2014. Does CEO transformational leadership influence top 
executive normative commitment? Journal of Business Research, 67: 1170-1177. 
Zaccaro, S. J., & Klimoski, R. 2002. The interface of leadership and team processes. Group & 
Organization Management, 27: 4-13. 
Zhang, X. A., Li, N., Ullrich, J., & van Dick, R. 2015. Getting everyone on board: The effect of 
differentiated transformational leadership by CEOs on top management team effectiveness and 
leader-rated firm performance. Journal of Management, 41: 1898-1933. 
Zhen, T., Xuan, Y., & Jing, Z. 2012. Trusting relationships of CTO-CEO and CTO's participation in 
technology strategy: Based on empirical study of Chinese high-tech firms. Chinese Management 
Studies, 6: 137-159. 
Zona, F. 2014. Board leadership structure and diversity over CEO time in office: A test of the 
evolutionary perspective on Italian firms. European Management Journal, 32: 672-681. 
Zona, F. 2016. CEO leadership and board decision processes in family-controlled firms: comparing 
family and non-family CEOs. Small Business Economics, 47: 735-753. 
 
ENDNOTES 
1  Example based on DRW Technologies case (Greyser & Ellet, 2015; Harvard Business 
School Publishing). 
2 Specifically, biology, chemistry, physics, computer science, mathematics, sociology, 
psychology, geography, economics, and marketing. 
3 The Web of Science searches were performed between October and November 2016. 
4 Our third criteria, party interdependence, could not be deduced from abstract or title 
information alone. This is considered in the final step.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES  
 
Table 1 
Representative Definitions of Interfaces  
Management Definitions of Interfaces 
Author / Year Type of 
Interface 
Definition of Interface 
Wren (1967) Inter-
organizational 
interface 
 “Interface is defined as the contact point between relatively autonomous organizations which are interdependent and interacting as they seek to cooperate to achieve some 
larger system objective. Interface is proposed as a research tool aiding understanding of interorganizational problems” (p. 69) 
Hillman & Keim 
(1995) 
Business-
government 
interfaces 
 “One way of thinking about variation in the government- business interface is to view some actors in the political process as demanders and others as suppliers of public 
policies, and some institutions in the process on the demand side and others on the supply side. Different institutional settings may affect the interaction of the actors and 
institutions and subsequent public policy outcomes in systematic ways” (p . 199) 
Moenart & 
Souder (1996) 
R&D/Marketing 
Interface 
The interface is defined in terms of extra-functional communication – the interpersonal transfer of information. Develops a model of information utility based on the 
receiver’s perception of the comprehensibility, credibility, relevance, and novelty of information. 
Araujo, Dubois 
& Gadde (1999) 
Resource 
interfaces 
“Resource interfaces are primarily concerned with the technical interdependencies that arise when the resource bases of buyer and supplier are connected through exchange 
activities.” (p. 499) 
Zaccaro & 
Klimoski (2002) 
Leader-Team 
Interface 
“We refer to the various ways that leadership and team processes become intertwined so as to influence collective performance. At is basic level, the interface can refer to 
the direct effect of each set of processes on performance (e.g., leadership processes influencing team performance; team processes influencing leader effectiveness). At a 
higher level, leadership and team processes can affect one another and be affected by prior collective performance. At the most complex level, leadership and team 
processes can be inextricably integrated such that the boundaries of each set of processes become fairly indistinct” (p. 6) 
Ashenbaum & 
Terpend (2010) 
Inter-functional 
interfaces 
“An inter-functional interface is a set of boundary-spanning activities across which two (or more) functions are assigned some measure of collective responsibility and 
engage in a set of integration efforts” (p. 178) 
Raes, Heijtes, 
Glunk, & Roe 
(2011) 
Top 
management 
team-middle 
manager 
interface 
“We conceptualise the interface of the TMT and MMs as a place where the separate worlds of the TMT and MMs intersect, characterized by an alternation of episodes of 
contact during which interaction or “interface processes” take place, and periods of no contact during which TMT and MMs act on their own on the basis of assumptions, 
expectations, and roles. A critical postulate in the interface model is that what happens during the episode of contact influences what happens in the periods without 
contact” (p. 103) 
Mollenkopf, 
Frankel & Russo 
(2011) 
Cross-
functional 
interfaces 
Cross-functional integration at the marketing-operations interface: “Functional integration across the two domains refers to how operations and marketing communicate 
and coordinate their activities in order to align them towards common goals” (p. 392) 
Albers, 
Wohlgezogen, & 
Zajac (2013) 
Alliance 
Interfaces 
“The interface between partners can vary in strength, that is, the number and type of boundary spanners involved, the number of connections among them, and the intensity 
of their interaction. We can term these parameters of interface strength the scope, density, activity” (pp. 9-11). 
de Bloke et al 
(2014) 
Modular system 
interfaces 
“Interfaces, in general, prescribe how two components or service providers in a modular system mutually interact” (p. 175) 
Rau, Moslein, & 
Neyer (2015) 
Knowledge 
interfaces 
“At established interfaces among actors of different functions, knowledge sharing is part of actors’ primary task within the innovation process and is determined by 
specialization. Actors’ interdependence is based on specialization and division of labor at the newly emerging interfaces, actors not being part of the original and formally 
defined innovation process are integrated to improve innovation processes’ output” (p. 341-342) 
 
Cross-Disciplinary Definitions of Interfaces 
Author / Year Discipline Definition of Interface 
Nel et al. (2009) Biochemistry  “The ‘nano–bio’ interface comprises the dynamic physicochemical interactions, kinetics and thermodynamic exchanges between nanomaterial surfaces and the surfaces of 
biological components (for example proteins, membranes, phospholipids, endocytic vesicles, organelles, DNA and biological fluids).” (p. 543)                             
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Heinz & 
Ramezani-
Dakhel (2016) 
Chemistry “Simulation results have indicated the dynamic nature of the interfaces in which the peptides move on and off the silica surface, effectively spending a certain fraction of 
time in close contact with the surface” (p. 430)         
Schaschke 
(2014)  
Engineering  The boundary between two phases such as two immiscible liquids, a liquid and vapour or gas, a gas and a solid, or a gas and a vapour or gas. The interfacial area is the area 
of the boundary between the two phases. The interfacial tension is the surface tension at the surfaces between two phases. 
Mayhew (2015) Geography The zone of interaction between two systems or processes. Estuaries are the interfaces between fluvial and marine systems. 
Protti et al 
(2013) 
Geology “The interface between convergent plates produces most of the world’s largest earthquakes” (p. 1) 
 
“Along the subduction interface, the transition between subducted segments corresponds to differences previously noted in the depth of microseismicity , predicted thermal 
profiles, tomographically defined slab morphology and long-term net forearc uplift over multiple seismic cycles.” (p. 3) 
Berenson (1968) Marketing  “An interface can be defined as a common boundary between systems. Chemists and chemical engineers have developed a fairly well structured and eminently useful body 
of knowledge about the transfer of materials and energy across an interface” (p. 9) 
Murray & 
Habul (2011) 
Information 
Systems 
We use the terms computer interface and interface as defined by Benyon, Turner, and Turner (2005) to refer “those parts of the system with which people come into 
contact physically, perceptually and conceptually” (p. 12). Physical contact includes pushing buttons and clicking on the functional features of the interface (e.g., radio 
buttons, pull down menus and hyperlinks). Perceptual contact refers to what the user sees. Conceptual contact refers to the user’s efforts to try to work out what the 
interface does and what it should be doing, including messages from the device that help the user to figure it out. From this general perspective, the interface is an integral 
part of how people interact with computer systems and, thus, understanding how small changes in the functional design of the interface affect use and preference is 
important to the management of information systems” 
Encyclopaedia 
Britannica  
Physics Interface, surface separating two phases of matter, each of which may be solid, liquid, or gaseous. An interface is not a geometric surface but a thin layer that has properties 
differing from those of the bulk material on either side of the interface. A common interface is that between a body of water and the air, which exhibits such properties 
as surface tension, by which the interface acts somewhat like a stretched elastic membrane. Interfacial effects, or processes that occur at interfaces, include the evaporation 
of liquids, the action of detergents and chemical catalysts, and the adsorption of gases on metals. 
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Figure 1 
Article Review Process 
  
Progeny (citation) search of Hambrick & Mason (1984):
Articles that focus on strategic leaders and how they
accomplish their goals - a subset will consider SLIs 
Combined Keyword Search:
The net result of searching for articles with over 50 
distinct keyword combinations, provided below
2,121 articles
50 ultimately retained
Articles at risk for review
Consolidation Process
Duplicates across the search populations removed
2,476 articles
71 ultimately retained
Duplicates
4,167 articles
430 articles
Screening Process
Title / abstract reviewed using two criteria: 
1. multiple parties present and 2. evidence of contact
Articles at risk for coding
Coding Process
Articles coded and categorized using 25 
dimensions, coding guide iteratively updated
Final population and framework
Excluded
Validation Process – Ancestry Search
Reference search and analysis of articles 
cited by at least 10% of coded population
Step 2 Located ArticlesStep 1 Located Articles
3,966 articles
201 articles, 4.8% yield 
Validation Process - Rater Agreement
A subset of ~20% of the population 
examined for coding consistency
Initial coding guide
122 articles, 60.2% yield  
Coding revealed 80 non-interface articles:
26 single party
24 no interface (e.g., perceptions)
8 non-executive populations
22 other (e.g., reviews, un-locatable)
5,164 articles referenced
40 articles met criteria
1 additional article located
Overall agreement = 91%
ICC (2,1) = .85 (absolute agreement)
ICC (2,3) = .94 (consistency)
Fleiss’ kappa = 84.5%
Initial framework
Step 1: Step 2:
Step 3:
Step 4:
Excluded 80 articles
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Figure 2 
A General Framework for Strategic Leader Interfaces (SLIs) 
 
 
 
 
What is the wider social context 
of interfaces?
•Hierarchical
•Relational
•Organizational
•Cultural
What demands and imperatives 
give rise to interfaces? 
•Job demands
•Strategic challenges
•Dynamism
What is the nature of 
interdependence?
•Pooled
•Sequential
•Reciprocal 
What are the manifestations of interfaces?
•Frequency of interaction (ongoing, periodic)
•Scope of interaction (bilateral, multi-lateral)
•Mode of interaction (face-to-face, virtual)
What is the nature of influence at the 
interface?
•Influence type (cognitive, regulatory, 
behavioral, cultural, political)
•Influence direction (up, down, lateral)
•Influence pattern (enabling, constraining)
What are the distal impacts of 
interfaces?
•Firm performance 
•Firm growth
•Firm innovation
CONTEXT
Why do interfaces occur?
What is intersected at the interface?
•Attributes (experience, leadership style,     
personality, dispositions, demographics)
•Aspirations (interests, goals, preferences)
•Activities (emergent states, team processes)
CONSEQUENCES
What are the impacts of interfaces?
What are the proximal impacts of 
interfaces?
•Strategic choice and chnage
•R&D investment
•Strategic decision-making quality
•Organizational behavior and 
dynamics
CONTACT
What happens at these interfaces? 
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Figure 3 
Descriptive Summary of Interface Studies 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
1 Pooled 22 22
2 Sequential 0 56 56
3 Reciprocal 0 0 30 30
4 Job demands 1 3 3 6 7
5 Strategic challenges 3 4 3 0 10 11
6 Dynamism 2 5 5 1 1 10 12
7 Hierarchical 6 21 3 4 3 6 26 31
8 Relational 8 13 9 1 3 2 2 26 31
9 Organizational 3 7 5 1 1 1 1 2 14 18
10 Cultural 5 9 9 0 0 4 2 1 1 19 23
11 Inter-SL 6 41 17 3 1 7 21 8 9 11 77 85
12 SL-Internal 9 12 4 1 4 4 3 6 1 6 4 15 25
13 SL-External 7 3 9 2 5 3 2 12 4 2 4 6 11 21
14 Downwards 7 35 12 2 2 6 19 12 6 15 41 14 4 59 59
15 Upwards 4 10 0 1 2 2 4 6 3 2 10 4 14 0 15 15
16 Lateral 6 6 12 3 7 1 4 9 6 3 19 4 3 0 0 26 26
17 Multidirectional 5 5 6 1 0 3 4 4 3 2 14 3 0 0 0 0 17 17
18 Constraining 2 9 4 3 6 1 5 3 1 2 12 2 4 9 2 5 2 18 18
19 Enabling 13 28 17 2 4 7 16 18 7 17 31 16 13 37 9 11 3 0 60 60
20 Multiple 5 13 7 1 1 3 6 7 4 3 19 5 2 9 3 6 9 0 0 27 27
21 Unclear 2 6 2 1 1 0 3 2 6 1 8 2 2 4 1 4 3 0 0 0 12 12
22 Socio-cognitive 1 13 5 1 1 1 3 3 2 4 8 1 1 17 1 2 4 12 4 0 9 20
23 Socio-regulatory 7 18 11 1 5 2 6 10 8 6 20 2 8 18 6 11 4 13 13 8 5 3 20 39
24 Socio-behavioral 3 6 5 0 1 2 1 1 1 8 6 1 2 10 1 3 1 3 7 3 2 3 3 6 15
25 Socio-cultural 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
26 Socio-political 8 20 10 3 3 9 11 7 4 4 18 6 4 22 7 4 6 11 15 10 3 5 13 3 0 18 39
27 Strategic change 1 2 3 0 1 1 1 3 0 2 2 2 3 2 0 2 2 3 2 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 7 7
28 R&D investment 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 3 3
29 Decision quality 0 1 4 1 0 0 1 2 1 1 4 1 0 3 0 0 2 0 3 2 0 1 2 1 0 2 0 0 5 5
30 Other 3 8 1 0 0 0 4 3 1 3 9 5 0 10 2 0 2 2 9 2 1 3 4 2 1 2 0 0 0 13 13
31 Performance 3 14 8 2 0 7 8 7 4 7 21 4 3 22 1 3 2 6 14 8 0 9 7 3 0 14 1 0 1 0 28 28
32 Other 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
4 2 3 8 9 6 2 1 4 4 0 3 5 0 6 5 2 3 0 1 8 4 1 5 9 3 5 10 7 8 4 13
Category
Number of studies in category combination
Count
31
Unique
Articles
117
117
84
28
94
122
C
on
te
xt
C
on
ta
ct
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s
Number of Blank Cells:
Distal outcomes
Form of 
interdependence 
Demands and 
imperatives
Parties present
Influence direction
Influence pattern
Influence 
mechanisms
Social context
108
Proximal outcomes 28
 
 
Interpreting Figure 3: For example, reading off column 7 (which pertains to hierarchical social contexts), 26 articles exclusively focused on this context, while 2 articles examined the interplay of 
hierarchical and relational context jointly (see row 8, col. 7).  Similarly, 19 of the 31 articles were focused on downward influence direction (row 14, col. 7), but only four considered upward 
influence direction (row 15, col. 7).  Finally, the bottom row of the table indicates how many rows are blank, indicating no study in our sample considered the two sub-aspects of the framework 
simultaneously based on our coding.   
Notes:  
1. The count column represents unique articles in that category, and therefore the rows will not sum to the total count since articles can be counted more than once.  
2. Articles coded to more than three categories within a certain group (e.g., socio-cognitive, socio-behavioral, and socio-political) are not counted in this table. 
3. Red colored cells indicate where no articles are present.  Grey cells are for mutually exclusive categories or for dependent variables that are rarely studied simultaneously. 
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Appendix 1 
Summary of Representative Interface Articles 
Author / 
Year   Method  
 Research Context / 
Sample   Key Findings  / Arguments  
Interface Influence Outcomes 
 Context   Parties    Direction   Pattern   Mechanisms   
Friedman, 
Carmeli, & 
Tishler (2016) 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
Random sample of 324 
small firms that applied for 
a loan through Israel's SME 
Fund. Cross-industry 
sample 
CEO transformational leadership is positively associated 
with TMT behavioral integration, which mediates the 
relationship between CEO transformational leadership 
and strategic decision comprehensiveness. In turn, 
comprehensiveness mediates the relationship between 
behavioral integration and organizational capability to 
adapt. 
Hierarchical CEO-TMT Downwards Enabling Socio-political; 
Socio-cognitive; 
Socio-regulatory 
Decision quality;  
Adaptability 
Sauerwald, 
Lin, & Peng 
(2016) 
Longitudinal 
archival 
8197 firm-year observations 
of publicly held US 
corporations included in the 
RiskMetrics Directors 
universe between 1999 and 
2010 
Firms with high external board social capital will have 
greater excess CEO returns when the CEO has more 
power. Powerful CEOs are able to weaken the negative 
effects of internal board social capital on CEO excess 
returns. 
 
CEO-BOD Upwards Enabling 
  
Mannor, 
Wowak, 
Bartkus, & 
Gomez-Mejia 
(2016) 
Multi-method 
(survey, 
interview, 
archival) 
84 top executives and 154 
unique strategic decisions in 
US firms. Gathered data on 
anxiety from CEO spouse 
CEOs use TMTs for social buffering, but only when the 
top executive is facing a loss context. 
 
CEO-TMT Lateral Enabling Socio-regulatory 
 
Costanzo & 
Di Domenico 
(2015) 
Longitudinal 
case study 
Single UK company start-up 
venture observed over two 
years with 20 interviews of 
multiple TMT members 
supplemented with 
ethnographic observation 
and organizational 
documents 
CEO’s lack of risk-taking intrapreneurialism and 
imposition of TMT roles and structures better suited to 
the larger parent company initially constrain change 
processes.  However, ‘dialectical–paradox’ tensions are 
created and resolved through upheaval, resulting in a 
change in strategic direction 
Cultural CEO-TMT Multidirecti
onal 
Constraining 
 
Strategic change 
Lin & 
Rababah 
(2014) 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
210 Jordanian Firms with 
responses at the TMT level 
only 
CEO-TMT exchange leads to TMT empowerment, 
which in turn results in higher levels of decision quality 
(the mediating relationship is supported) 
Relational; 
Cultural 
CEO-TMT Downwards Enabling Socio-political; 
Socio-cognitive 
Decision quality 
Ou, Tsui, 
Kinicki, 
Waldman, 
Xiao, & Song 
(2014) 
Multiple 
survey 
Survey data gathered twice 
from 328 TMT members 
and 645 middle managers in 
63 private companies in 
China 
CEO humility was positively associated with CEO 
empowering leadership. In turn, CEO empowering 
leadership was related positively to TMT integration, 
which subsequently predicted empowering 
organizational climate.  This in turn was positively 
related to middle manager work engagement, affective 
commitment, and job performance. 
Cultural CEO-TMT 
TMT-
Internal 
Downwards Enabling Socio-cognitive; 
Socio-regulatory; 
Socio-behavioral 
Employee 
outcomes 
Bruynseels & 
Cardinaels 
(2014) 
Longitudinal 
archival 
design 
Three Board-Ex derived 
samples depending on the 
dependent variable: 10,922 
firm-years for audit effort, 
3,187 for going-concern 
opinions, 7,283 for internal 
controls 
Social ties formed through the friendship network of the 
CEO (i.e., via other activities) reduces audit committee 
effectiveness. However, not all connections are 
detrimental, because the negative impact was not 
observed for social ties formed between a CEO and their 
audit committee through employment or education 
Relational CEO-BOD Upwards Enabling 
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Krause & 
Semadeni 
(2014) 
Longitudinal 
archival 
study 
352 separations of CEO / 
board chair roles, using 
firms in the Corporate 
Library database which 
draws from Fortune 1000 / 
S&P 1500 
Poor performance increases the likelihood of a demotion 
separation of CEO-board chair positions (i.e., becoming 
CEO only).  Also found evidence to suggest that dual 
CEO chairs who become a chair only have the shortest 
career horizon, while those who become CEO only have 
the longest career horizons.  Totally exiting CEOs are 
somewhere in between. 
Hierarchical CEO-BOD 
chair 
Lateral Multiple 
  
Chen (2013) Longitudinal, 
archival 
design 
876 firm-year observations 
of Taiwanese electronics 
firms 
The reduction in R&D intensity at early and late stages 
of CEO tenure is less prominent for boards with high 
levels of human / social capital 
Relational CEO-BOD Downwards Multiple Socio-political; 
Socio-regulatory 
R&D investment 
Jong, Song, & 
Song (2013) 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
323 new ventures in 
technology industries 
Several findings, including: 
(1) CEO Openness increases TMT task conflict but 
decreases relationship conflict 
(2) CEO Neuroticism increases TMT relationship 
conflict but has no effect on task conflict 
(3) CEO Extraversion decreases TMT relationship 
conflict but has no effect on task conflict  
(4) CEO Agreeableness increases TMT task conflict but 
has no effect on relationship conflict 
(5) CEO Conscientiousness leads to lower levels of 
TMT task and relationship conflict 
Hierarchical CEO-TMT Downwards Enabling Socio-political; 
Socio-cognitive 
Firm 
performance 
Heyden, 
Doorn, 
Reimer, Van 
den Bosch, & 
Volberda 
(2013) 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
3,518 firms in the 
Netherlands from a variety 
of different industries, with 
manufacturing, services, 
construction and transport 
all being at least 10% of the 
sample 
Environmental dynamism increases external advice 
seeking, while firm underperformance increases internal 
advice seeking.  Evidence suggest that TMT 
heterogeneity is negatively related to CEO external 
advice seeking and positively related to internal advice 
seeking.  
Hierarchical
; Relational 
CEO-TMT 
CEO-
Internal 
CEO-
External 
Upwards Enabling Socio-political 
 
Raes, Bruch, 
& De Jong 
(2013) 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
191 top management team 
members and 5048 
employees in 63 German 
organizations 
TMT behavioral integration also impacts employee 
outcomes of job satisfaction and turnover intentions both 
directly as well as through its impact on productive 
energy. 
Hierarchical TMT-
Internal 
Downwards Enabling Socio-political; 
Socio-cognitive; 
Socio-regulatory 
Employee 
outcomes 
Song, Zhang, 
& Wu (2014) 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
Sample of 608 middle 
managers, 140 top 
managers, and 40 CEOs in 
China 
CEO caring leadership weakens the relationship between 
team-level top managerial support and middle manager 
performance.  CEO authoritative and task-oriented 
leadership appears to strengthen the relationship 
between top manager support and middle manager 
performance. 
 
CEO-
Internal 
TMT-
Internal 
Downwards Enabling Socio-cognitive 
 
Westphal, 
Park, 
McDonald, & 
Hayward 
(2012) 
Longitudinal 
survey 
Sampling frame of mid-
sized US companies with 
>$100MM in sales; 367 
CEOs over 16 quarterly 
spells from 2004 - 2007, 
with 5 years of rolling data 
(meaning 9 years of data 
altogether) 
CEOs who previously received impression management 
support from a fellow CEO will be more likely to 
provide that support to the fellow CEO, another CEO in 
the same industry,  
particularly if the focal CEO is aware that the fellow 
CEO has helped others in the past. 
Relational CEO-
External 
Lateral Enabling Socio-regulatory 
 
Carmeli, 
Tishler, & 
Edmondson 
(2012) 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
Sampling frame of 500 
alumni from Israeli 
executive MBA program, of 
which 77 CEOs responded 
Relational leadership of the CEO leads to TMT trust 
which explains learning from failures and decision 
quality 
Relational CEO-TMT Downwards Enabling Socio-behavioral Decision quality 
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with a sufficient number of 
their TMT members 
Ren & Guo 
(2011) 
Conceptual N/A Argues that the two functions of middle managers are to 
pre-screen opportunities and that they will also be 
strategic in how they sell these issues to top 
management. 
Hierarchical TMT-
Internal 
Upwards Multiple Socio-political 
 
Raes, 
Heijltjes, 
Glunk, & Roe 
(2011) 
Conceptual N/A Argues that information exchange, mutual influencing, 
TMT role behavior, and MM role behavior are salient 
aspects of the MM-TMT interface. 
 
TMT-
Internal 
Multidirecti
onal 
Multiple Socio-political; 
Socio-regulatory 
Decision quality; 
Firm 
performance 
Buyl, Boone, 
Hendriks, & 
Matthyssens 
(2011) 
Cross-
sectional 
survey  
Sample of 32 Belgian and 
Dutch IT companies from a 
sampling frame of 206 firms 
The relationship between TMT diversity and 
performance is negative for generalist CEOs and 
founder CEOs.  However, when CEOs and TMTs share 
past experience, they tend to do perform better.  There is 
evidence to suggest that information exchange and 
diversity may partially explain these effects. 
Organizatio
nal 
CEO-TMT Downwards Enabling Socio-political; 
Socio-regulatory 
Firm 
performance 
Hayibor, 
Agle, Sears, 
Sonnenfeld, & 
Ward (2011) 
Multi-sample 
cross-
sectional 
survey 
Two survey samples: 253 
CEOs and their TMTs and 
CEOs of 79 companies and 
non-profit organizations 
located in the United States.  
Top management team members who reported that 
their values were generally similar to those of their 
CEO were more likely to report that their CEO 
demonstrated charismatic leadership. 
Cultural CEO-TMT Downwards Unclear Socio-behavioral 
 
Ling, Simsek, 
Lubatkin, & 
Veiga (2008) 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
Sampling frame of 795 New 
England SMEs, of which 
152 firms with matched 
CEO / TMT samples were 
available 
Transformational leadership imparts a number of 
characteristics on the TMT, including behavioral 
integration, responsibility decentralization, risk-taking 
propensity, and LT compensation philosophy. All 
behaviors except for behavioral integration were 
subsequently linked to corporate entrepreneurship 
Cultural CEO-TMT Downwards Enabling Socio-political; 
Socio-cognitive; 
Socio-regulatory; 
Socio-behavioral 
Strategic change 
Raes, Glunk, 
Heijltjes, & 
Roe (2007) 
Longitudinal 
case study 
Longitudinal case study of a 
public Dutch TMT over a 
six month period of 
observation  
TMT sense-making about leadership contains three 
elements: (a) image of middle managers and their 
leadership expectations; 
(b) self-image and preferred leadership approaches, and  
(c) the relationship between the two as a basis for action 
Hierarchical TMT-
Internal 
Downwards Unclear Socio-political; 
Socio-regulatory 
 
Arendt, Priem, 
& Ndofor 
(2005) 
Conceptual N/A Argued that as environmental dynamism increases, 
CEOs will be more likely to rely on informal advisory 
systems for information and advice in making strategic 
decisions. 
Further, CEOs of organizations pursuing cost leadership 
and defender strategies should tend to rely more on their 
organizations’ formal advisory systems for information 
and advice in making strategic decisions while 
differentiation and prospector strategies tend to rely 
more on an informal advisory system. 
Relational CEO-
Internal 
CEO-
External 
Upwards Enabling Socio-political 
 
Hambrick & 
Cannella 
(2004) 
Longitudinal 
archival 
study 
3168 firm-year observations 
of 404 firms in 21 industries 
available in D&B book of 
corporate management 
No evidence that industry dynamism (operationalized in 
multiple ways) was related to the presence of COOs, but 
extraordinary organizational task demands will prompt a 
CEO to have a COO, we found a strong effect from 
company size. Interestingly, CEOs who have COOs 
deliver lower performance than those who do not 
Hierarchical CEO-Exec Downwards Constraining Socio-political Firm 
performance 
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Peterson, 
Smith, 
Martorana, & 
Owens (2003) 
Multi-method 
(archival, q-
sort) 
Observations of chief 
executive officer (CEO) 
personality and TMT 
dynamics for 17 CEOs 
CEO Conscientiousness related to team-level concern 
for legalism and sense of control over the environment. 
CEO emotional stability related to team cohesion, 
intellectual flexibility, and leader dominance.  
CEO Neuroticism not significantly related to team risk 
taking.  
CEO Agreeableness significantly related to team-level 
cohesion and decentralization of power.  
CEO Extraversion was significantly related to the group 
process measure of leader strength or dominance. 
CEO Openness was significantly related to team risk-
taking and team intellectual flexibility. 
Relational CEO-TMT Downwards Multiple 
 
Firm 
performance 
McDonald & 
Westphal 
(2003) 
Multi-method 
(survey, 
archival) 
241 firms in the industrial 
and service sectors from the 
Forbes list 
When CEOs are in low performing firms, they seek 
more advice from their friends and people with the same 
industry experience.  In particular, to the extent to which 
they get information from their friends less strategic 
change will occur and the level of change is less effected 
by poor performance. 
Relational CEO-
External 
CEO-
Internal 
Lateral Constraining Socio-political; 
Socio-regulatory 
Strategic change 
Enns, Huff, & 
Higgins 
(2003) 
Multi-method 
(interviews, 
survey) 
69 matched pair CIOs and 
other executives in 
Canadian and US firms 
CIO relational persuasion and personal appeal are 
positively associated with CIO influence, however 
exchange and pressure are influence tactics that are 
negatively associated with influence. 
Hierarchical TMT-Exec Lateral Multiple 
  
Shen (2003) Conceptual N/A Argues that boards need to provide CEO development 
opportunities early in tenure, and then transition to 
monitoring later - if this happens, increased performance 
will result.  To that end, boards should use behavior-
based compensation, rather than outcome-based 
compensation early in CEO tenure and modify approach 
as tenure increases. 
Hierarchical
; Relational 
CEO-BOD Downwards Multiple Socio-cognitive;  
Socio-regulatory 
Firm 
performance 
Roberts & 
Stiles (1999) 
Interviews In-depth interviews with 30 
chairmen/chief executive 
dyads in large UK public 
companies 
The division of CEO and board responsibilities - notably 
concerning strategy and external relationships is 
ambiguous and complex.  Negotiation of responsibilities 
is shaped by founding conditions of the relationship, 
both at the firm level, and in terms of the history of the 
personal relationship. 
Hierarchical CEO-BOD 
Chair 
Lateral Enabling 
  
Westphal 
(1999) 
Multi-method 
(survey, 
archival) 
Survey of 243 CEOs and 
564 outside directors. 
CEO-board friendship ties are positively related to the 
level of advice and counsel interactions on strategic 
issues.  As CEO ownership or longer-term incentive 
plan compensation increased, the negative effects of 
friendship ties on board monitoring grew weaker, and 
the positive effect of such ties on advice interactions 
grew stronger. 
Relational CEO-BOD Downwards Enabling 
 
Firm 
performance 
Zajac, & 
Westphal 
(1996) 
Longitudinal 
archival 
491 directors who were also 
CEOs for firms listed in the 
Forbes and Fortune 500 lists 
for 1986, with data collected 
from 1985 - 1992 inclusive 
For boards that alter the outsider ratio, whether the CEO 
is also a board member, or change the structure of CEO 
compensation, their directors of that board are more 
likely to go to similar boards in the future. 
Relational BOD-
External 
Lateral Constraining 
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Appendix 2  
Potential Future Research Directions 
Key Opportunities Future Research Direction Select Propositions 
Better understand the conditions 
that give rise and shape the 
structure of SLIs  
Developing interdependencies:  
Move past useful, but limiting conceptualizations of interdependence to capture not 
only the directionality, but the basis of dependence between parties. 
P1: Reciprocal interdependence is more likely to characterize an SLI interface if more 
than one interdependence type (resource, informational, decisional, and psychological) is 
present compared to only one interdependence type. 
P2: Informational interdependence is positively associated with psychological 
interdependence in later periods, with this effect being stronger at the CEO-TMT than the 
TMT-MM interface. 
Building process models of emergence: Using case and narrative approaches, 
develop higher fidelity accounts of how the strategic and social context co-evolve 
to shape the genesis and emergence of interfaces. 
 P3: The co-evolution of environmental dynamism (strategic context) with a collectivistic 
cultural orientation (social context) leads to psychological interdependencies, which in 
turn promotes socio-regulatory influence mechanisms in the CEO-board interface.  
Generate “new ways of seeing” 
by constructing or importing 
constructs, tools, and vocabulary  
Specifying different forms of contact: Identifying the main types and manifestations 
of contact based on temporal (ongoing, episodic, punctuated) and spatial 
dimensions (close, distant). Deploying observational and ethnographic techniques 
to observe SLI contact “in the wild” 
P4: Ongoing, close contact between the CEO and the board chair during the early stages 
of CEO/board chair tenure fosters trust and goal alignment and is conducive to the 
development of routines that facilitate subsequent punctuated distant contact. 
 
 
    
Opportunities for cross-fertilization: Find suitable constructs from related 
disciplines and resituate them in the SLI nomological network to more accurately 
describe the processes that unfold at the interface. 
P5: The level of CEO-BOD diagnosticity (situations where partners can evaluate one 
another’s true goals and motives) moderates the relationship between board monitoring 
and firm performance such that the relationship is less positive at higher levels of 
diagnosticity. 
Attention to governing mechanisms: 
Determine what micro-processes are the underlying basis for cascading effects and 
determine the conditions that facilitate or hamper the presence of these second 
order effects.  
P6: CEO transformational leadership is related to employee commitment through two 
mechanisms: a) direct contact with front line employees, and b) through promulgation of 
employee-centric employee policies. 
Holistic approaches to examining contact: Consider multiple interfaces 
simultaneously and assess how they can complement, counter-act, or nullify each 
other.  
P7: As the level of board monitoring of the CEO increases, the a) quantity and b) quality 
of CEO-TMT exchanges will decrease. 
Develop understanding of the 
wider implications of SLIs and 
the impact of performance 
feedback processes on SLIs 
Exploring potential dark-sides: Greater attention to the constraints created by SLIs, 
as well as interfaces as carriers and amplifiers of negative behaviors. 
 
P8: Ongoing and frequent communication and information exchange between the CEO 
and TMT may reduce the opportunity and motivation of CEO and/or TMT members to 
seek external advice and information, accelerating groupthink.  
 
P9: Episodic, distant contact between the CEO and board of directors may slow down the 
pace of decision-making, inhibiting the ability of firms to seize external opportunities 
(i.e., those investment projects requiring approval at board level) 
 
 
Modeling feedback processes: Examining the impact of past performance on the 
stability of SLIs through feedback processes.  
P10: Performance below aspirations increases the degree of interdependency between the 
CEO and board of directors; CEO and top management team; and top management team 
and middle managers.  
   
 
